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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction is in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to: Art.
VIII § 5 of the Utah Constitution; U.C.A. §§ 59-1-608 (1987) and
78-2-2(3) (j) (1991); and Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Plaintiffs raise this additional issue:
Issue:

Did the trial court err in ruling that a direct

violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111 (hereafter "§ 111") is not actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(hereafter "§ 1983") when it granted

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count V of Plaintiffs1 Amended
Complaint?
Standard of Review:

In reviewing

an appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we review only the facts
alleged in the complaint. In determining whether the trial
court properly granted the motion, we accept the factual
allegations in the [amended] complaint as true and consider
them and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, [cites omitted]. We
will affirm the dismissal only if it is apparent that as a
matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts
alleged, [cites omitted]. Because we are considering only the
legal sufficiency of the complaint, we give the trial court's
ruling no deference and review it under a correctness
standard.
Lowe v. Sorenson

Research

Co.,

779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
4 U.S.C. § 111
U.C.A. § 59-10-529
U.C.A. § 63-46b-14
U.C.A. § 78-33-1 and 2

Utah Constitution Art. I, § 7
Utah Constitution, Art. If § 2
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 11
Utah Constitution, Art. I and 24
Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case - For many years Defendants unlawfully
taxed Plaintiffs by granting state income tax exemptions to retired
state employees covered under the state
illegally

taxing

retirement system while

federal retirees. Three hundred

thirty-five

Plaintiffs, plus a number of federal retiree organizations filed a
Class Action Complaint in the Tax Division of Third District Court
seeking among other things, 1) a declaratory order that Utahfs
taxation of federal retirees was unlawful for all tax years in
dispute, 2) an order compelling Defendants to recognize Plaintiffs1
class claims for refund, and to compute and pay refunds, and 3) an
award of costs and attorneys1 fees (in the § 1983 action).
Course of Proceedings - Plaintiffs submit the following
addition to the statement of the course of proceedings submitted by
Defendants:
On

April

5,

1989

the

State

Tax

Commission

(hereafter

"Commission") issued a widely published press release stating Davis
was not retroactive and refunds would not be granted to federal
retirees. R. 130.

This denial of refunds by the Commission was

prior to the filing of Plaintiffs1 Complaint. After the Complaint
-2-

was filed, the trial court relieved Plaintiffs of the requirement
to exhaust administrative remedies. R. 250. The Plaintiff class
was then certified. R. 289. However, the Commission proceeded to
schedule administrative hearings on May 30, 1990 involving members
of the Plaintiff class.

R. 292.

The trial court temporarily

enjoined the Commission from conducting administrative hearings,
granting members of the class the opportunity to opt out of the
class and proceed before the Commission should they choose.

R.

367.
Disposition in the lower court - By summary judgment the trial
court declared the Utah taxing scheme to be in violation of 4
U.S.C. § 111, found refunds to be appropriate under U.C.A. § 59-10529 for the 1985-88 tax years and to be appropriate under U.C.A. §
59-1-301 for the 1988 tax year, ordered the Commission to issue
refunds to members of the class who paid state income tax on
federal retirement income during 1985-88, and awarded interest,
costs and attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs. R. 1140, 1141.
Statement of facts - Plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the
statement of facts made by Defendants in the following respects:
Defendants repeatedly cite as facts, claims that were stricken
by the trial court as being irrelevant.

Plaintiffs did not nor

were they required to file responsive affidavits to contest the
assertions in Defendants1 stricken affidavits. Defendants1 cite to
facts not found by the trial court on pages 10, 12 and 13 of
Defendants1 brief dealing with the belief of the Commission, the
-3-

good faith of the State, the "estimated" refunds to be paid to
Plaintiffs,

and the financial

impact

to the

State

of Utah.

Defendants also argue these claims in their brief as if they were
facts.

(See pages 63 and 64 of Defendants1 brief).

Plaintiffs

submit Defendants have improperly represented these allegations as
facts in their statement of facts.
Plaintiffs hereby submit the following additional facts:
1.

Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff class received

pay or compensation as a result of personal services rendered as
officers of employees of the United States.
2.

R. 289, 1120.

The State of Utah taxed the income of Plaintiffs and

members of the Plaintiff class and did not tax the income of
retired state employees.

R. 401, 1120.

The U.S. Supreme Court decided Davis v. Michigan

3.

on March

28, 1989.
4.

On April 5, 1989, the Commission issued a press release

stating that refunds would not be granted to federal retirees and
that Davis
5.

was not retroactive.

R. 130. Addendum, Exh. 1.

The plaintiff class consists of approximately 34,000

individuals and/or estates, the majority of whom are of advanced
age.

R. 130, 213, 251-252, 1121.
6.

The size of each class member's refund claim is small in

amount in relation to the high cost of pursuing a resolution of the
claim.

R. 252, 1121.
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7.

Prior to April 17, 1989 Defendants received hundreds of

phone calls from members of the plaintiff class protesting the
collection of 1988 Utah state income taxes on Plaintiffs' federal
retirement compensation.
8.

Representative

R. 402, 403, 1121.
Plaintiffs

and more

than

3,000 Utah

members of the National Association of Retired Federal Employees
(NARFE),

protested

for themselves

and

"all

others

similarly

situated", the collection of state income tax on their federal
retirement benefits by filing with Defendants on or before April
17, 1989 a "Notice of Claim", and "Class Claim for Refund", seeking
a refund of all state income taxes paid on federal retirement
benefits for the 1985 through 1988 tax years, specifically alleging
the illegality of the state income tax under federal and state law.
R. 402, 455-463, 1122.
9.

Many representative Plaintiffs and hundreds of members of

the plaintiff class also protested payment of their 1988 state
income taxes by calling the Commission, by filing written protests
and by filing 1988 amended returns prior to the 1988 due date, or
by filing claims for protection of rights in the form and manner
prescribed by the Commission.
10.

R. 402, 464-591, 1122.

Representative Plaintiffs for themselves and all others

similarly situated, plus over 3,000 Utah members of the National
Association of Retired Federal Employees (NARFE) filed timely class
claims for refund with the Commission for the years 1985 through
1988.

R. 403, 455-593, 1122. Addendum, Exh. 2.
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11.

Individual class members filed claims with the Commission

for the years indicated below seeking a refund of state income
taxes paid on federal retirement benefits.

The number of such

individual claims filed with the Commission for each tax year were:
1985: 11,921; 1986: 16,892; 1987: 15,185; 1988: 11,827
R. 403.
12.

On March 30, 1990, Plaintiff class, by and through legal

representatives, filed a "Protective Claim" with the Commission on
a form prepared by the Commission.
13.

R. 403, 593. Exh. 2.

The Commission instructed Plaintiffs in February 1990 to

file protective claims by April 16, 1990, to protect their claims
for refund for the 1985 and 1986 tax years within the three-year
statute of limitations.
14.

R. 926-934, 1123.

The Commission has consistently and publicly taken the

position since April 5, 1989, that refunds of state income taxes
paid by federal retirees will not be paid.

R. 595-604, 917-934.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
By taxing federal retirees while exempting its own state
retirees, Utah violated 4 U.S.C. § 111 and the rule in Davis

v.

Michigan.

v.

Georgia

The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Beam
is dispositive on the retroactivity issue of Davis

under

the Federal Doctrine. Under Beam, other courts are no longer free
to apply the Chevron

test to determine the retroactivity of a

previously decided U.S. Supreme Court case; they must apply the
same rule that was applied to the litigants in the case. The case
-6-

must be read as being retroactive to its litigants if it is silent
on the issue of retroactivity or if the court does not reserve the
issue in the opinion itself.
The Supreme Court in Davis

characterized its opinion as the

plain reading of an unambiguous statute.

The U.S. Supreme Court

has never refused to give retroactive effect to the plain meaning
of an unambiguous statute. To do so would offend basic separation
of power principles.
Utah

has

a

specific

income

tax

refund

remedy

which

incorporates by definition Federal Tax Law and Procedure. Although
Defendants claim Plaintiffs must first pay taxes under protest
before they can obtain refunds, neither the refund statute nor the
federal

law

so

requires.

The

federal

refund

procedure,

incorporated into the Utah statute by specific reference, abolished
the requirement of a payment under protest more than sixty years
ago.

Utah's statute allows for refunds of tax "overpayments", a

term specifically defined in the Utah Statute and in federal law to
encompass taxes unlawfully assessed.

Under Utah law, the more

recent and specific refund of income tax remedy must be preferred
over the ancient and general payment under protest remedy.
Defendants improperly ask this Court to craft a new remedy in
place

of

the

retroactive.

income

tax

refund

statutes

even

if Davis

is

To do so, however, would violate state and federal

constitutional protection.

Defendants assume the equities in the

case favor them, but the equities follow the law.
-7-

When the Commission publicly announced that the Davis case was
not retroactive and that refunds would not be paid, plaintiffs
sought a declaratory order in district court.

The court had

jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties. The trial court
properly applied U.C.A. § 63-46b-14 to relieve plaintiffs of the
exhaustion of administrative remedies before the Commission because
the burden to the taxpayers would far outweigh the minimal benefit
to be gained through hearings.

The Commission had neither the

authority to invalidate Utah's tax laws, nor the authority and
expertise to decide the retroactivity of a U.S. Supreme Court
decision. When the Commission ignored the court's order relieving
exhaustion of remedies and attempted to compel five members of the
class to appear at formal tax commission hearings, the trial court
properly and joined enforcement of its prior order.
In deciding the legal issues in protecting the rights of the
class, the trial court has not prevented the Commission from doing
what it does best.

If tax refunds are sustained on appeal, each

member of the class will need to file an individual amended income
tax return, which may be reviewed and challenged in a normal
administrative process.
The trial court properly defined the class.

Defendants'

principal objection to the class definition is the granting of
refunds to persons who did not pay their taxes under protest. This
is

a

substantive

issue

and

should

be

considered

as

Defendants do not dispute the propriety of a class action.
-8-

such.
U.C.A.

§ 78-33-11 in the Declaratory Judgment Act requires the court to
join all parties in the action who have a claim or interest
effected by the declaration; the class action is the obvious
mechanism for accomplishing this.
Section 111 makes no distinction between civilian retirees and
military retirees.

Defendants objection on this issue is without

merit.
Defendants had a full and fair opportunity to object to the
proposed final order and did make all objections they had to make.
Defendants1 criticism of the trial court is unfair.
Two recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have supported
a § 1983 civil rights action in this case.

The trial courtfs

dismissal of Plaintiffs' § 1983 civil rights action should be
reversed.

The trial court's award of fees and the costs of return

preparation should be sustained.
The

Utah

Constitution

fundamental principles.

requires

frequent

recurrence

to

Fairness in the exaction of taxes is one

of the fundamental principles upon which this country was founded.
This case presents an unusual opportunity to review and apply those
fundamental principles necessary to a free government.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED § 111 TO INVALIDATE UTAH'S
TAXING SCHEME.
A.
SECTION 111 IS A LIMITED WAIVER OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX
IMMUNITY.
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The Federal Statute, § 111 is a limited waiver by the United
States of its intergovernmental tax immunity, a doctrine derived
from McCulloch

v. Maryland,

4 Wheat, 3316 (1819) , in which the U.S.

Supreme Court held that the State of Maryland could not impose a
discriminatory tax on the Bank of the United States.
Davis

v.

Michigan

(hereafter "Davis").

Dep't.

of

Treasury,

489 U.S. 803

Cited in
(1989),

For over one hundred years, McCulloch

was

read broadly to prohibit one sovereign from taxing the employees of
another.
Gerhardt,

In 1938, however, the Court decided in Helvering

v.

304 U.S. 405 (1938), that the federal government could

impose nondiscriminatory income taxes on most state employees.
That decision was followed a year later by Graves
rel.

O'Keefe,

v.

New York

ex

306 U.S. 466 (1939)1, in which the Court, for the

first time, permitted nondiscriminatory state taxation of federal
1

The 1939 Graves decision and enactment of § 111 directly
impacted Utah law. Until Graves and § 111, Utah exempted all
federal income (including pensions) from state income taxation.
Ut.Rev.St. 1933, § 80-14-3.
In 1938 the Utah Tax Commission
challenged the applicability of the exemption in the case of an
attorney employed by a federal agency, lost at the Utah Supreme
Court and appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court for a judicial
delineation of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine.
The U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion the same day it
issued the Graves opinion, referring Utah to Graves and instructing
Utah that intergovernmental immunity no longer presented the
nondiscriminatory taxation of federal employee compensation.
VanCott v. State Tax Commission, 306 U.S. 511, 59 S.Ct. 605, 83
L.Ed. 950 (1939), decision on remand 96 P.2d 740 (Utah 1939). Utah
effectively repealed the exemption three (3) days after the Utah
Supreme Court's December 28, 1939 opinion on remand. Laws 41, Ch.
85, § 2 (effective January 1, 1940). Utah lost no time in rushing
to embrace the new intergovernmental immunity rules codified in §
111 (1939) . Now the State attempts to distance itself from its own
legal history and calls it all "unforeseeable", "a surprise."
-10-

Davis,

employees.

489 U.S. at 811.

Section 111 provides in

relevant part:
The United States consents to the taxation of pay or
compensation for personal service as an officer or employee of
the United States...by,a duly constituted taxing authority
having jurisdiction, if the taxation does not discriminate
against the officer or employee because of the source of the
pay or compensation, (emphasis added).
The waiver of federal sovereign immunity allowed by Graves and
codified in § 111 in only a limited waiver. Section 111 expressly
prohibits

state taxation which discriminates

against

federal

officers or employees on the basis of the source of the pay or
compensation which is being taxed.

Davis

at 808.

B.
DAVIS HELD THAT DISCRIMINATORY
RETIREES VIOLATED § 111.
In Davis,

TAXATION

OF

FEDERAL

the United States Supreme Court applied § 111 and

the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity to state taxation of
federal retirement benefits. In an 8-1 opinion, the Court held the
Michigan tax scheme violated § 111 and the coextensive prohibition
against

discriminatory

taxes

embodied

in

principle of intergovernmental tax immunity.
The Court in Davis

the
Id.

constitutional
at 813.

applied a three-part analysis. First, the

Court found that federal retirement pay is "pay or compensation for
personal services as an officer or employee of the United States."
Id.

at 808.

111 applied

In rejecting the State of Michiganfs argument that §
only

to

current

federal

retirees, the Supreme Court explained:

-11-

employees, not

federal

While retirement pay is not actually disbursed during the time
an individual is working for the Government, the amount of
benefits to be received in retirement is based and computed
upon the individual's salary and years of service.... [B]ecause
these benefits accrue to employees on account of their service
to the Government, they fall squarely within the category of
compensation for services rendered "as an officer or employee
of the United States." (citations omitted).
Id.

at 808.
Second, the Supreme Court held that Michiganfs disparate tax

treatment

of

retirement

benefits

violated

§

111

and

was

unconstitutional because it "discriminate[ed] in favor of retired
state employees and against federal employees."

Id.

at 817.

Third, the Court rejected Michigan's attempts to justify the
discrimination, noting that the State's interest in discriminating
"is simply irrelevant."

Id.

at 816. Having found retirement pay

to be immune from discriminatory taxation and the Michigan tax
statute to be discriminatory, the Supreme Court concluded the
statute violated § 111 and the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity.
C.

Id.

at 817.

UTAH TAXED FEDERAL RETIREES IN VIOLATION OF § 111.

Defendants have conceded that Davis

applied to the Utah tax

scheme that taxed federal retirees while exempting state retirees,
and that Davis

required revision of Utah's tax lav/. Df bf p. 84.

Defendants do not challenge the trial court's ruling that
Utah's taxing scheme violated § 111 as defined in Davis.
principle defense is that the Davis
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Their

decision was "unforeshadowed"

and therefore should not apply retroactively to the tax years in
dispute:

1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988.

II. RETROACTIVITY OF U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES IS DETERMINED BY
FEDERAL RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE.
In determining the retroactivity of a case, lower courts
properly refer to the rules of the court announcing the decision.
See Great

Northern

Railway

287 U.S. 358, (1932).

Co. v. Sunburst

Oil

and Refining

Co.,

Retroactivity of a U.S. Supreme Court

decision is governed by the federal doctrine of retroactivity.2
American

Trucking

Association

v.

Smith,

110 S.Ct. 2323 (1990)

(hereafter "ATA").
Since Davis,

the U.S. Supreme Court decided three landmark

retroactivity cases which circumscribe the present boundaries of
the federal retroactivity doctrine.
The trial court correctly

(McKesson,

ATA, and Beajn) .

followed the federal retroactivity

doctrine set forth in these recent cases.
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S RECENT DECISION IN JAMES B. BEAM
DISTILLING CO. V. GEORGIA, U.S. Ill S.CT. 2439 115 L.ED. 2D 481
(1991) (HEREAFTER "BEAM") IS DISPOSITIVE OF THE RETROACTIVITY
ISSUE.
2

Although Defendants concede the application of federal
retroactively doctrine, they seek refuge under -Rio Algom Corp. v.
San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984) , Loyal Order of Moose No.
259 v. County Board of Equalization,
and Board of Education v. Salt
Lake County,
659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983). (Df bf p. 88). Though
Utahfs retroactivity rules may differ from the federal doctrine in
some respects (ftnt 4), the "law changing" threshold is the same.
In the cases cited, and in all other Utah decisions discovered by
Plaintiffs, the Utah Supreme Court has given prospective-only
application to law reversing rules arising from difficult issues of
constitutional interpretation.
None involved conduct which
violated the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute.
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K.

BEAM REJECTS "SELECTIVE OR MODIFIED" RETROACTIVITY.

The

U.S.

Supreme

Court

applied

the

commerce

clause to

invalidate a Hawaii tax which discriminated against out of state
liquor purchasers in Bacchus

Imports,

(1984) (hereafter "Bacchus").

Ltd.

v.

Dias,

468 U.S. 263

Shortly after Bacchus,

the James H.

Beam liquor company filed suit in Georgia for refunds of taxes paid
before Bacchus.

The Georgia Supreme court acknowledged

unconstitutionality of Georgia's tax under the holding of
but applied analysis contained in Chevron
U.S.

97

(1971),

(hereafter

prospective-only opinion.

"Chevron"),

Oil
to

Co. v.
label

the

Bacchus,

Huson,
Bacchus

404
a

In its analysis, the Georgia Supreme

Court noted Bacchus

had reversed prior U.S. Supreme Court commerce

clause precedents.

The Georgia Supreme Court also noted it had

specifically ruled the challenged statute to be constitutional one
year after its enactment in 1938.

Because the cost of granting

refunds to the State of Georgia was substantial, the Court found
the Chevron
denied.

analysis favored non-retroactivity and refunds were

James H. Beam appealed.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in
Beam.

In a 6-3 opinion, the Court ruled the Georgia Supreme Court

erred in:

1) applying the Chevron

analysis to a case already

decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, and 2) in failing to see that
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Bacchus

followed the normal course of full retroactivity in civil

cases.3
Beam

rejected

"selective

or

modified"

retroactivity

by

mandating that any opinion applied retroactively to its litigants
must apply retroactively to all others similarly situated whose
claims are not barred.
Thus, the question is whether it is error to refuse to apply
a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing
the rule has already done so. We hold that it is, principles
of equality and stare decisis
here prevailing over any claim
based on a Chevron Oil analysis.
* * *

The grounds for our decision today are narrow.
They are
confined entirely to an issue of choice of law: when the
court has applied a rule of law to the litigants in one case
it must do so with respect to all others not barred by
procedural requirements or res judicata.
Beam at 2446.
The Court noted that "we have never employed Chevron Oil to
the end of modified civil prospectivity".

Id.

at 2445.

Justice

White concurred, "there being no precedent in civil cases applying
a new rule to the parties in the case but not to other similarly
situated. . ."4 Id.

at 2448 J. White, concurring opinion).

(Even

3

In Welch v. Cadre Capital,
946 F.2d 185 (2nd Cir. 1991),
the Second Circuit addressed a remand in light of Beam and provided
an insightful analysis of Beam.
4

In this respect, Federal retroactivity doctrine differs
from the Utah rule. See: Rio Algom v. Corp. v. San Juan County,
681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984).
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the dissent did not dispute this total lack of precedent for a
contrary rule).
B.
BEAM REJECTS USE OP THE CHEVRON ANALYSIS BY ANOTHER COURT
ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE THE RETROACTIVITY OF A UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT CASE.
What of the Chevron

analysis after Beam?

As the Court noted

in Beam:
Both parties have assumed the applicability of the Chevron Oil
test. . .But we have never employed Chevron Oil to the end of
modified civil prospectivity.
* * *

Our decision here does limit the possible applications of the
Chevron Oil analysis, however irrelevant Chevron Oil may
otherwise be to this case. Because the rejection of modified
prospectivity precludes retroactive application of a new rule
to some litigants when it is not applied to others, the
Chevron Oil test cannot determine the choice of law by relying
on the equities of the particular case [citation omitted].
Once retroactive application is chosen for any assertedly new
rule, it is chosen for all others who might seek its
prospective application. The applicability of rules of law
are not to be switched on and off according to individual
hardship; allowing relitigation of choice-of-law issues would
only compound the challenge to the stabilizing purpose of
precedent posed in the first instance by the very development
of "new" rules. Of course, the generalized enquiry permits
litigants to assert, and the courts to consider, the equitable
and reliance interests of parties absent but similarly
situated.
Id.

at 2445 and 2447.
The impact of Beam on the federal doctrine of retroactivity is

this:

The U.S. Supreme Court may or may not apply the

Chevron

analysis in deciding the issue of retroactivity as to the litigants
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themselves. But, it is error for other courts to apply the Chevron
analysis to a case already decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.5
C.
BEAM MANDATES THAT OTHER COURTS ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE
THE RETROACTIVITY OP A U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINION FOCUS THEIR
INQUIRY ON THE OPINION ITSELF.
Because the pivotal issue is how the Court applied the rule of
a case to its litigants, other courts now must look to the opinion
itself with their sole line of inquiry being, "Did the U.S. Supreme
Court apply its rule retroactively to the litigants?"

The rule

applied to the litigants must be applied to all, and re-litigation
of the retroactivity issue in other courts is error.
D.
UNDER THE BEAM ANALYSIS, A U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINION IS
RETROACTIVE TO ITS LITIGANTS AND THUS TO ALL OTHERS, IF 1) THE
COURT APPLIED ITS DECISION RETROACTIVELY, OR 2) THE COURT
ALLOWED CONSIDERATION OF REMEDIES, OR 3) THE COURT DID NOT
RESERVE THE ISSUE OF RETROACTIVITY (SILENCE).
In deciding Beam, the U.S. Supreme Court made no promise to
specifically address the issue of retroactivity in all decisions.
5

Defendants analyze the opinion in Beam to conclude that
at least four and possibly six U.S. Supreme Court Justices would
still apply the Chevron analysis "in the proper case." Df bf pp.
68-78, especially p. 74. Bvit the issue is not whether the U.S.
Supreme Court will apply Chevron.
The issue is whether other
courts may apply Chevron to a case already decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The answer is no. To apply a different rule than
that applied to the litigants is error.
Defendants also conclude from the same analysis that "pureprospectivity" is not dead. Df bf pp. 68-78, especially p. 74.
That is not the issue. The Beam decision casts no doubt on whether
the Court, in the proper case, will continue to refuse
retroactivity both to the litigants and to all others similarly
situated (pure-prospectivity).
The issue is whether "pureprospectivity" can apply to Davis.
It cannot because the Court in
Davis neither refused retroactive application to the litigants nor
reserved the issue. Defendants are attempting to float on a "pureprospectivity" ship which has already sunk.
-17-

Indeed, the Court recognized that "[I]n most decisions of this
Court, retroactivity both as to choice of law and as to remedy goes
without saying."

Beam at 2445.

The Court in Bacchus
Beam,

did not address retroactivity.

But in

the Supreme Court of Georgia erred in failing to see that

Bacchus
cases.

followed the normal course of full retroactivity in civil
Beam at 2446.

In so ruling, the Beam court analyzed

important indicia of retroactivity.
1.
A case is retroactive if it applies
retroactively to its litigants.
Bacchus

its rule

was retroactively applied to its litigants so it was

applied retroactively to Beam.
2.
A case is retroactive
consideration of remedies.

if

the

court

In the Beam court's view (while favorably citing

allowed

Davis):

Indeed, any consideration of remedial issues necessarily
implies that the precedential question has been settled to the
effect that the rule of law will apply to the parties before the
Court. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at
(slip op. 25-28) passthrough defense considered as remedial question).
Because the
Court in Bacchus remanded the case solely for consideration of the
pass-through defense, it thus should be read as having
retroactively applied the rule there decided. See also Williams
v.
Vermont,
472 U.S. 14, 28 (1985); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton,
462 U.S.
176, 196-197 (1983); cf. Davis v. Michigan Dept. of ^Treasury,
489

U.S. 803, 817 (1989).
Id.

(emphasis added).

at 2445, also 2448

[concurrence of J. White]; 2450

[concurrence of J. Scalia, J. Marshall and J. Blackman]; [all cases
are retroactive]; 2451 [Dissent by J. O'Connor, C.J. Rehnquist, J.
Kennedy] (agreeing that Bacchus

applied its rule retroactively).
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3.
A case is retroactive if the Court does not reserve
the issue of retroactivity (silence).
In the Court's view:
. . . Bacchus is fairly read to hold as a choice of law that
its rule should apply retroactively to the litigants then
before the Court. Because the Bacchus opinion did not reserve
the question whether its holding should be applied to the
parties before it, compare American Trucking Assns.,
Inc.
v.
Scheiner,
483 U.S. 266, 297-298 (1987) (remanding case to
consider whether ruling "should be applied retroactively and
to decide other remedial issues"), it is properly understood
to have followed the normal rule of retroactive application in
civil cases. If the Court were to have found prospectivity as
a choice-of-law matter, there would have been no need to
consider the pass-through defense; if the Court had reserved
the issue, the terms of the remand to consider "remedial"
issues would have been incomplete. (emphasis added).
Id.

at 2445; also 2450,

[concurrence of J.

Scalia, J.

Marshall, J. Blackman] (all civil cases are retroactive).
On this test for retroactivity of a decision, even the dissent
agreed:
I agree that the Court in Bacchus
applied its rule
retroactively to the parties before it. The Bacchus opinion
is silent on the retroactivity question. Given that the usual
course in cases before this Court is to apply the rule
announced to the parties in the case, the most reasonable
reading of silence is that the Court followed its customary
practice. (emphasis added)•
Id.

at 2451; [Dissent by J. O'Connor, C.J. Rehnquist, J.

Kennedy (dissenting on selective retroactivity issue only)].
Ee
APPLYING THE BEAM ANALYSIS, DAVIS WAS RETROACTIVE TO ITS
LITIGANTS AND THUS TO ALL BECAUSE, 1) DAVIS RETROACTIVELY
INVALIDATED THE MICHIGAN TAX IN PRIOR YEARS; 2) DAVIS ALLOWED
ITS LITIGANTS TO CONSIDER REMEDIAL ISSUES; AND 3) DAVIS DID
NOT RESERVE THE ISSUE OF ITS RETROACTIVITY (SILENCE) .
1.
Davis is retroactive because it applied its rule
retroactively to invalidate the Michigan tax in prior
years.
-19-

The Supreme Court's 1989 invalidation of Michigan's scheme in
Davis

applied to the years 1979-1984, the only years for which a

refund was sought. Davis v. Michigan Dep't

of Treasury,

160 Mich.

App. 98, 408 N.W. 2d 433 (Mich. 1987). Retroactive invalidation of
the tax law in these earlier years was the circumstance under which
the state conceded a refund.

(See Davis

at 817).

2.
Davis
is retroactive because it
litigants to consider remedial issues.

allowed

its

As the Court in Beara observed:
[A]ny consideration of remedial issues necessarily implies
that the precedential question has been settled to the effect
that the rule of law will apply to the parties before the
court.
Beam at 2445.
The parties in Davis did not stipulate to a refund. The State
of Michigan

"conceded that a refund is appropriate

in these

circumstances" if it was determined the state taxed Mr. Davis in
violation of § 111. Davis

at 817.

(Emphasis added).

Because the

Court so determined, it invalidated the Michigan tax in prior years
and accepted Michigan's concession regarding the appropriate remedy
under state law.

That the Court looked at all to the appropriate

remedy, and allowed a refund to Mr. Davis, made Davis

retroactive

to its litigants.
If there is any doubt on this issue, the Beam Court's citation
to Davis

as an analogous supporting authority should resolve the

issue.
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Because the Court in Bacchus remanded the case solely for
consideration of the pass-through defense, it thus should be
read as having retroactively applied the rule there decided.
n2 See also Williams
v. Vermont,
472 U.S. 14, 28 (1985);
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton,
462 U.S. 176, 196-197 (1983); cf.
Davis
v. Michigan
Treasury,
489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989).
(emphasis added)•
Id.

at 2445. This citation to Davis alone, joined in by J. Stevens

(the sole dissenter in Davis)

and unchallenged by any member of the

Court, is irreconcilable with Defendants1 assertion that Davis

is

not retroactive.
3.
Davis is retroactive because it did not reserve the
issue of retroactivity (silence)•
Davis

did not reserve the issue of retroactivity and, other

than to allow a refund, was silent on the issue. A case which does
not reserve the issue f,is properly understood to have followed the
normal rule of retroactive application in civil cases".
2445.

Beam at

"The most reasonable reading of silence is that the court

followed its customary practice "of retroactive application".
at 2451 (dissent by O'Connor).

Davis

Id.

must be read to follow the

normal course of retroactivity to its litigants and thus to all
others.
4.
to

The U.S. Supreme Court views Beam to be applicable
Davis.

If the Court's citation to Davis

in Beam is not clear enough,

any lingering doubt about Beam's applicability to Davis should have
vanished on June 28, 1991, eight days after the Beam decision, when
the U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded the South Carolina and
Virginia federal retiree "Davis"

cases for further consideration in
-21-

light of Beajn. Bass v. South
cert,
v.

Carolina,

395 S.E.2d 171 (S.C. 1990)

granted, vacated and remanded 111 S.Ct. 2881 (1991); Harper

Virginia

Department

of

Taxation,

401 S.E. 2d 868 (Vir. 1991)

granted, vacated and remanded, 111 S.Ct. 2881 (1991).6

cert,

IV. THE PLAIN INTERPRETATION OF AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE DOES NOT
RAISE AN ISSUE OF RETROACTIVITY (CHEVRON) .
Even after Beam,
forth in Chevron
Davis.

Defendants argue the three prong test set

should be used to determine the retroactivity of

Plaintiffs submit Beam is clear on the issue of federal

retroactivity doctrine, but will respond to Defendants1

Chevron

analysis below.
A.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CHARACTERIZED DAVIS AS THE
PLAIN READING OF AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE, § 111.
Because the court announcing a decision is the ultimate
authority on its retroactivity, the trial court appropriately
analyzed the Davis

opinion itself. Michigan argued in Davis

that

its taxation of federal retirees was justified by the reading of §
111.

The Supreme Court rejected Michigan's argument.

"In our

view, however, the plain language of the statxite dictates the
opposite conclusion."

Davis

at 1808. The court continued:

6

Defendants quibble about the meaning of these remands.
(Df bf p. 69, ftnt 25).
However, generalized studies and
statistics are meaningless because so many cases involve multiple
issues and require additional factual determinations.
The So.
Carolina and Virginia cases presented a single issue: May a case
applied retroactively to its litigants not be applied to others
similarly situated? (answer: No) . The meaning of these remands
is clear: Beam applies to Davis.
-22-

We have no difficulty concluding that civil service retirement
benefits are deferred compensation for past years of service
rendered to the government.
Id.

at 808.
The

Court

called Michigan's

interpretation

"hypertechnical reading" of the statute.

Id.

of

at 809.

§

111 a

"Any other

interpretation . . .," said the Court, "would be implausible at
best."

Id.

at 110.

The court rejected Michiganfs attempts to

argue the legislative history of § H I :
The language of the statute leaves no room for doubt . . .
legislative history is irrelevant to the interpretation of an
unambiguous statute...
Id.

at 809, ftnt 3.
The Court found it "difficult to imagine" that Congress

intended Michigan's interpretation of § 111 and emphasized:
Nothing in the statutory language or even in the legislative
history suggests this result . • • the overall meaning of §
111 is unmistakable.
Id.

at 810.
To Michigan's

contention

that

federal

retirees

are not

entitled to protection under the immunity doctrine, the court
observed:
[A]11 precedent is to the contrary • • . the state offers no
reason for departing from this settled rule, and we decline to
do so.
Id.

at 815.
B.
THE PLAIN INTERPRETATION OF AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE DOES
NOT MEET THE "LAW CHANGING" THRESHOLD OF CHEVRON.
A decision must be retroactive if it does not
-23-

establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear
past precedent on which the litigants may have relied . . . or
by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was
not clearly foreshadowed . . .
Chevron,

404 U.S. at 106.

In light of the Supreme Court's own characterization of

Davis,

Defendants have an impossible burden in showing that the U.S.
Supreme Court would view its interpretation of § 111 as "law
changing" or "unforeshadowed".
plain interpretation.
of statutory law.

A statute must foreshadow its own

Any contrary rule would raze the structure

The U.S. Supreme Court does not apply its

doctrine of non-retroactivity to the interpretation of plain and
unambiguous statutes.7

West Virginia

Univ.

Hosp.,

Inc.

v.

Casey,

111 S.Ct. 1138, 1147 (1991) "The sole function of the court is to
enforce it [the statute] according to its terms"; Aloha
Inc.

v.

Director

of Taxation,

Airlines,

464 U.S. 7 (1983) (invalidating a

Hawaii tax on airlines, the Court said, "We acknowledge that our
interpretation of § 1513(a) may result in disruption of state

7

It has no power to do so.
For a court to suspend
application of the plain meaning of an unambiguous federal statute
for reasons other than its unconstitutionality would violate the
separation of powers embodied in the Constitution, c.f.: Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 164-166, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). See also:
William "Sky" King v. St. Vincent's
Hospital,
60 USLW 4061, Case
No. 90-889 (decided December 16, 1991) in which the Court found
itself not "free to tinker with the statutory scheme."
Separation of power concerns do not arise when a court
reverses its own interpretations of the Constitution or common law
and then limits the effect of those decisions (non-retroactivity of
common law and constitutional decisions allowed where no question
of impairment of federal rights is involved).
-24-

systems of taxation; we are, however bound by the plain language of
the statute."

Id.

at 14 n.10.).

C.
INTERPRETING A FEDERAL STATUTE IS A PAR DIFFERENT MATTER
FROM INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION OR COMMON LAW.
In ATA, supra at p. 13, the Court noted that the retroactivity
of its decision interpreting a federal statute in Owen v. City
Independence,

of

445 U.S. 622 (1980) was a far different matter from

deciding whether to give retroactive effect to its own case law
ATA at 2334.

decisions.

In Owen, the Court construed the difficult § 1983 civil rights
statute and rejected the municipalities reasonable but contrary
interpretation.
responsible

The Court emphasized that holding a municipality

for the

foreseeable

interpretation

of

a

federal

statute:
. . . merely makes municipalities, like private individuals,
responsible for anticipating developments in the law. We
noted that such liability would motivate each of the cityfs
elected officials to consider whether his decision compares
with constitutional mandates and . . . weigh the risk that a
violation might result in an award of damages from the public
treasury. Id. at 556. This analysis does not apply when a
decision breaks with precedent, a type of departure which, by
definition, public officials could not anticipate nor have any
responsibility to anticipate, [cite omitted, emphasis added].
ATA at 2334.
Courts have found prospective-only decision making a useful
tool

for

softening

constitutional

fence

the

sometimes harsh

lines.

Because

effects

true

of

changing

boundaries

of

a

constitution are not painted on the soil, courts forever seek them
with new surveying instruments.

But, a statute is a wall and the
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rules of statutory construction have not changed substantially
since Congress built its first walls.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never refused to give retroactive
affect to the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. Never.
D.
BECAUSE DAVIS DID NOT MEET THE "LAW CHANGING" THRESHOLD
OF THE CHEVRON ANALYSIS, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DECLINED
CONSIDERATION OF THE REMAINING TWO "PRONGS" OF CHEVRON.
The trial court, citing Ashland
3202

(1990),

Oil,

Inc.

v. Caryl,

110 S.Ct.

(hereafter "Ashland"), correctly viewed the "law

changing", first "prong" of Chevron as "a threshold test which, if
not met, will be dispositive of the issue" of retroactivity.
Conclusions of Law, p. 19, R. 1137. In Ashland,

West Virginia had

imposed a gross receipts tax on out-of-state wholesalers while
exempting local manufacturers.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the retroactivity of Arjnco v.
Hardesty,

467 U.S. 638 (1984), which invalidated a similar tax.

Because Armco was not "revolutionary," the first "prong" of Chevron
was not satisfied.

The first prong being a "threshold test," the

-26-

Court did not consider the last two elements of the Chevron test.8
Ashland

at 3205.

Applying the policy and equity elements of the second and
third "prongs" of the Chevron test to a decision which is not "law
changing"

is contrary to the whole purpose of

federal non-

retroactivity doctrine.
In those relatively rare circumstances where established
precedent is overruled, the doctrine of non-retroactivity
allows a court to adhere to past precedent in a limited number
of cases, in order to avoid "jolting the expectations of
parties to a transaction." (emphasis added).
ATA at 2341. Quoting Northern

R. Co. v. Sunburst

Oil & Riners

Co.,

287 U.S. 352 (1932).

8

This limitation of non-retroactivity doctrine to
precedent overruling cases in ATA and the Court's refusal to apply
non-retroactivity in Ashland,
supra, to a case which is not
"revolutionary" is evidence of a narrowing of the scope and use of
the non-retroactivity doctrine by the U.S. Supreme Court. Once
used widely and almost exclusively in criminal procedure issues
(see Summary and Discussion in Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah
1983), the Court has practically abandoned the practice since
Griffith
v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314 (1987), mandated the application
of new rules of criminal procedure to all other cases or direct
review and not yet final. A like narrowing in the civil context is
best illustrated by the ATA decision. When the U.S. Supreme Court
in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner,
483 U.S. 266 (1987),
reversed its own line of cases going back more than fifty years, it
invalidated an Arkansas highway use tax valid under prior law.
Arguments of the State's reliance in ATA were compelling. Even so,
the court was badly split on the issue of retroactivity. Four
justices (dissenting) would never issue a prospective-only
decision; four (the plurality) thought the case should be
prospective-only and one (concurring) was against retroactive
application only because he believed the earlier line of cases was
still good law.
He, however, noted that "prospective-only"
decision making had no justification outside commerce clause
decisions. Thus, a majority of the ATA court would apply all noncommerce clause decisions (e.g. Davis) retroactively.
-27-

Justice White in Beam, explained that the Chevron test is "not
implicated"

where

the

court

thinks

its

"reasonably foreseeable and hence not a new rule."

decision

is

Beam at 2448

(Concurring Opinion of J. White).
Analysis of the second and third prongs of Chevron

also

suggests that the "law changing" threshold of the first prong is
determinative of the other two. When a new decision reverses prior
cases on which reliance was expected, reliance and policy arguments
are compelling and strongly favor application of the prior law.
Conversely, when, as in Davis,

the opinion merely declares the

plain meaning of an unambiguous statutes, the policy factors weigh
heavily

in

enactment.

favor

of giving

effect

to the

statute

from

its

In such a situation the party resisting retroactivity

can find no compelling reliance arguments ("others did it too",
"the court was wrong", "we didn't know the law", or "it's just too
expensive," are the only available arguments).
What policy, equitable consideration, or rule of law, allows
a state to ignore a federal statute with impunity until some court
finally interprets its plain meaning?

As the ATA court explained

its own unanimous ruling in McKesson Corp.
Beverages

and

Tobacco,

110

S.Ct.

2238

v. JDiv. of
(1990)

Alcoholic
(hereafter

"McKesson"):
Where a state can easily foresee the invalidation of its tax
statutes its reliance interests may merit little concern, see
McKesson, 110 S.Ct., at 2254-2255, 2257.
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ATA at 2333.

The trial court correctly found the "law changing"

test of Chevron

to be a threshold test.

E.
CONSIDERATION OF THE SECOND AND THIRD PRONGS OF
CHEVRON WOULD HAVE SHOWN COMPELLING REASONS FOR THE
RETROACTIVITY OF DAVIS.
The trial court granted Plaintiffs1 motion to strike the
affidavits submitted by Defendants dealing with the second and
third prongs of Chevron

because they were irrelevant. R. 1114.

Nonetheless, Defendants argue the allegations contained in the
stricken

affidavits,

Df

bf

pp.

63-64,

uncontested and presumed to be true.9
Chevron

as

though

they

are

If the last two prongs of

had been considered by the trial court, they would have

heavily favored the taxpayers.
1. Retroactive application of Davis will further
the policy of intergovernmental tax immunity.
In Davis

related litigation, the Arkansas State Supreme Court

upheld the awarding of refunds to federal retirees in a class
action suit.

Pledger

v.

Bosnick,

811 S.W.2d 286 (Ark. 1991).

After finding that Davis did not establish a new principle of law,
the court stated with regard to the second prong of

Chevron:

'Plaintiffs have maintained from the outset that Davis was
retroactive and therefore the Chevron analysis was improper. When
the trial court agreed and granted the motion to strike the
affidavits submitted by Defendants, Plaintiffs did not need to
present any evidence contesting the affidavits. Should this court
determine the trial court erred in striking Defendants' affidavits,
the proper course on remand would be to allow Plaintiffs the
opportunity to present evidence regarding hardship to members of
the class and regarding the second and third prongs of Chevron.
-29-

Obviously retroactive application will advance the doctrine
for the members of this class. Also, a refusal to apply the
doctrine in this case may retard the recognition of it in
other matters which come before the Arkansas legislature which
might fall under the scope of the doctrine.
Pledger

at 293.

In Montana, where the State Supreme Court found Davis
nonretroactive under Chevron,

to be

the dissent observed:

...the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity can only be
furthered by the retroactive application of Davis.
Refusing
to apply Davis
retroactively means that this Court has
condoned the Statefs total disregard for the plain language of
4 U.S.C. § 111 and is akin to a continuation of past
discrimination. Such a result does not further and, indeed,
retards the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity in that
it does not tend to deter future State violations of the
doctrine.
Sheehy

v. Montana,

Applying Davis

No. 90-450 (Mont. Nov. 14, 1991), p. 21.
retroactively will send a message to the

legislature that discrimination in areas of

intergovernmental

taxation is not permissible.
2.
The equities in this case favor retroactive
application of Davis.
In finding that the equities weighed in favor of the class of
Plaintiffs, the Arkansas Supreme Court found:
No doubt the State of Arkansas will suffer financial loss by
making a refund to the members of this class who follow the
procedures for such refund.
However, the third prong of
Chevron requires that the decision be applied retroactively
unless a substantial inequitable result will occur as a result
of the decision.
If inequitable results occur whether
retroactivity is applied or not, we must make the ruling
retroactive. Our decision in this case itself does not create
the hardship. It will exist regardless of the outcome of this
case. Clearly if the members of this class are not given the
relief they have prayed for, they will be treated inequitably
in that they will have paid an unconstitutional tax. Someone
-30-

here will suffer, either the state or the taxpayers. We are
not simply picking the class for refund based on need, nor are
we penalizing the state. We are determining that since one of
two inequitable results must occur, we are required to apply
the ruling retroactively.
Pledger
The

at 293.
two

dissents

in

Montana

pointed

out

the

obvious

inconsistencies in the majorities logic:
It is true, as the majority states, that refunds to
federal retirees would result in a financial burden on the
other taxpayers of the State; it also is true, however, that
those taxpayers have benefitted greatly from the federal
retirees1 overpayment of taxes over many years. In any event,
the state's and taxpayers1 exposure to the disruptive impact
of the tax scheme's invalidation is limited because of the
five-year statute of limitations.
*

*

*

Finally, it must be recognized that, notwithstanding the
financial impact to the State, substantial inequities have
been wrought upon the federal retirees over a period of many
years. Retirees who paid the discriminatory tax and have
since left Montana or died would receive no remedy even under
a proper resolution of this case. Others would receive back
only a small portion of the discriminatory taxes they paid, no
matter what remedy might be fashioned, because of the
applicable statue of limitations.
How the majority can
conclude that the Chevron "equities" prong favors the State,
as opposed to the federal retirees who were wrongfully
discriminated against by the State, is simply beyond my
understanding.
Sheehy v. Montana,

supra, p. 22.

As far as I am concerned, the issue involved in this case
is a simple one.
The State took the petitioners' money
illegally. That fact is obvious from the plain language of §
111. If a private citizen took someone's money illegally, he
or she would be forced to give it back. The State ought to do
the same.
The majority talks about equity. What is equitable about
allowing the State, with all its power, to illegally seize
-31-

someone's property, and then after being told what it did was
illegal, allowing the State to keep it?
* * *

The majority's decision is clearly a result-oriented
decision arrived at for the purpose of protecting the State's
coffers.
However, the State's coffers are not the
responsibility of this Court. The rights of this State's
citizens are.
Sheehy

v. Montana,

supra, pp 30-31.

Under either Beam or the first prong of Chevron, Davis
retroactive.

is

However, even an analysis of the equities favors

retroactive application of

Davis.

F.
THE ATA DECISION DOES MOT SUPPORT DEFENDANTS' CLAIM THAT
DAVIS IS RETROACTIVE,
Defendants

argue

that

ATA

supports

analysis because it confirms the Chevron
68.

their

retroactivity

analysis.

Df bf pp. 65-

Even ignoring Beam, Defendants' reliance on ATA is misplaced.

ATA involved the Court's ever-evolving struggle with the commerce
clause.10

Its application outside the commerce clause is limited.

However, ATA does illustrate the narrow scope of the federal civil
retroactivity doctrine.
That the court would hesitate to give prospective treatment to
a decision reversing fifty years of prior case law further explains

10

It is not surprising that the civil retroactivity cases
relied on by Defendants are, like virtually all civil cases with
retroactivity issues, commerce clause cases. The ATA court itself
was careful to distinguish its policy considerations in
interpreting the Constitution from those of interpreting a federal
statute.
-32-

its refusal three weeks after ATA, to apply non-retroactivity to
Ashland,
V.

supra.

DEPENDANTS1 ARGUMENTS DO NOT MAKE DAVIS RETROACTIVE.
A.
THE REAL SURPRISE TO UTAH OFFICIALS IS THE EXISTENCE OF
§ 111, NOT ITS MEANING.
No recent Utah official seems to have ever seen or read § 111

until the Davis

decision.11 Because Utah is charged with knowledge

of the law, Defendants are in the position of arguing that they
would not have thought § 111 applicable to federal retirees even if
they had seen it.
B.
DEFENDANTS*
IRONIC.

CRITICISM OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IS

Of necessity, Defendants criticize the U.S. Supreme Court's
view of § 111 as an unambiguous statute with a plain meaning and
fault the Courtfs reasoning in an attempt to characterize Davis as
law reversing.

Df bf pp. 52-60.

The irony of these arguments is

that the U.S. Supreme Court itself is the ultimate authority on the
foreseeability of its own decision.

See ATA at 2330.

C.
DEFENDANTS MISINTERPRET S 111 AND CALL DAVIS A NEW LAW
BECAUSE THEY DENY THAT FEDERAL RETIREMENT PAY IS "PAY OR
COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL SERVICE AS AN OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE OF
THE UNITED STATES".
Defendants1 argument that retirement pay is not deferred
compensation for prior service is without merit and illustrates the
path Defendants must take to call Davis
11

new law.

Deposition of Richard Hansen, Chairmen, Utah State Tax
Commission, R. 1159 at p. 23; Deposition of Roger Tew, Tax
Commissioner, R. 1163 at pp. 13-14.
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Federal

retirement

"deferred wages."

benefits

and

always

have

been,

See e.g. 59 cong. Rec 6300 (April 29, 1920),

(Statement of Rep. Hamill:

"Pension are not gratuities, and they

should not be considered as such.
deferred wages —

are,

They should be looked upon as

as payment of wages which were not disbursed at
See also Kizas

the time when they were earned.")
F.2d 524, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert,

denied,

v. Webster,

707

464 U.S. 1042 (1984).

Defendants' claim of surprise12 is puzzling in view of their

contrary position in Fitzpatrick
896

(Utah

1963),

in

v. State

which

the

Retirement

Tax Commission, 386 P.2d

Commission
benefits

prevailed
as

in

characterizing

private

deferred

compensation.13

(What else could they be, argued the Commission,

12

Defendants do not identify any prior precedent to the
contrary. Instead, they criticize the Supreme Court's citation to
its own precedent because "those cases did not discuss § 111." Df
bf p. 53.
This illustrates the narrowness of Defendants'
reasoning. Because Davis is the first case interpreting § 111,
they see no reason Utah should be held responsible to interpret and
comply with the statute prior to 1989.
13

Defendants attempt to distinguish their position in
Fitzpatrick
by arguing that private retirement benefits are
deferred compensation, but public retirement benefits are not. Df
bf p. 54, ftnt 14. As the trial court noted:
In the Court's view, this is a distinction without a
difference. That federal employees pay or compensation may
arise from a statutory enactment does not destroy the nexus
between retirement pay and the employees previous service with
the federal government.
Most federal retirees would be
justifiably offended at the States' view of their retirement
pay, earned over many years of faithful service to the United
States Government, as an unearned statutory entitlement.
Conclusions of Law, R. 1128.
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since the taxpayer invested no capital to purchase them?).

Id.

at

897.
Now, twenty-seven (27) years later, Defendants call the same
characterization in Davis

"unforeseeable", "a new rule of law".

Defendants1 claim of "surprise" that federal retirement benefits
are deferred compensation from federal employment is unbelievable.
Defendants1 argument also ignores this Court's holding which,
consistent with virtually all others, recognizes that federal
retirement benefits "derive from employment" and "are a form of
deferred compensation by the employer." Woodward v. Woodward, 656
P.2d 431, 432 (1982).
D.
DEFENDANTS MISINTERPRET 5 H I AND CALL DAVIS "NEW LAW91
BECAUSE THEY FAIL TO SEE § H I AS A STATUTORY LIMITED WAIVER
OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY.
The legal disagreements between the parties have their origin
in Defendants1 fundamental failure to see the connection between §
111 and

the doctrine

of

intergovernmental

tax

immunity. In

Defendantsf words:
This connection between § 111 and the intergovernmental tax
immunity clause was determined for the first time in Davis and
was neither dictated nor foreshadowed by prior precedent.
Df bf p. 56. u

Defendants1 position is incredible.

In applying

intergovernmental immunity principles to resolve the issue of a

14

Contrast this with the Arkansas Supreme Court• s statement
in Davis related litigation: "A review of the extensive historical
discussion in Davis will clearly show that the Doctrine of
Intergovernmental Immunity has been applied for decades." Pledger
v. Bosnick,
811 S.W. 2d 287, 297 (Ark. 1991).
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state's taxation of federal employees, the U.S. Supreme Court
expressly relied on a long line of cases.
Reference to intergovernmental immunity principles is not just
helpful in understanding § ill, these principles are the essence of
the statute; a limited waiver of immunity is its very purpose and
its plain meaning.
Defendants argue for a "traditional equal protection analysis"
of Utah's discriminatory taxation of federal employees.
55.

Df bf p.

Defendants use this to justify their unlawful taxation by

alleging their "rational basis" for so doing.15
If the United States and its former employees are immune from
taxation, no amount of good faith or rational reasons can rend the
immunity wall.

Only the United States can waive its own immunity

as it did in § lllf and then only in its own terms, i.e., that the
tax not discriminate.

As the Court noted:

15

Defendants' citations to state taxation cases decided
under equal protection are not helpful. See Df bf pp. 42, 43 and
55.

Lehnhausen

v. Lake Shore

Auto Parts

Co.,

410 U.S. 356 (1973) ,

appropriately applied equal protection analysis to uphold an ad
valorem personal property tax which discriminated between
individuals and business entities; Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co.,
301 U.S. 495 (1937) , appropriately applied €*qual protection
analysis to uphold a state unemployment tax which certain classes
of employers including all government entities. Neither of these
cases
involved
levied
on
federal
agencies
or
their
instrumentalities.
Huckuba v. Johnson,
573 P.2d 305 (Or. 1977), (cited p. 42,
ftnt 7 ) , affirmed Oregon's practice of giving preferential tax
treatment to retirees over a certain age.
This is not
discrimination on the basis of the "source of income" prohibited by
§ 111. The two New Jersey tax cases cited in the same footnote
uphold the taxing of private annuities while exempting public
annuities. This is also irrelevant.
-36-

The State's interest in adopting the discriminatory tax, no
matter how substantial, is simply irrelevant to an inquiry
into the nature of the two classes receiving inconsistent
treatment.
Davis

at 816.
The Davis

prohibit

Court interpreted S 111 just as it reads: to

"discrimination11.16

The only possible

justification

Michigan could have in discriminating between state and federal
employees

is if they were not similarly

situated,

i.e., if

"significant differences" existed between the two classes.17

Davis

at 816.

The only difference between federal retirees and state

retirees

in

compensation.

the matter

of

taxation

was

the

source

of

the

This was an express violation of the plain reading

of § 111.
Now, Utah makes the same argument Michigan made and tries to
characterize Davis as a reversal of prior law, as "unforeshadowed."
Df bf p. 51.

But, the Court's refusal to allow a breach in the

16

"Discrimination" is the disparate treatment of similarly
situated classes. See: BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, p. 553 (4th Ed.
1968) .
17

Defendants further confuse the retroactivity issue by
their reliance on Teague v. Lane, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989), the
dissent in Milton v. Nainwright,
407 U.S. 371 and United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), for the proposition that a case which
disrupts a widely accepted practice is not retroactive. Df bf pp.
49-50. These are criminal cases dealing with revolutionary new
criminal rules which contradicted prior decisions.
Their
considerations do not exist in the civil context and never became
part of the Chevron analysis. In criminal cases, the prospective
or retroactive effect of decisions involve a wide range of
considerations. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, (Utah 1984).
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wall of federal sovereign immunity because a state has a rational
basis for discriminatory taxation is not new law.
E.
DEFENDANTS' CLAIM OF RELIANCE ON THE PRACTICE OF OTHER
STATES DOES NOT MAKE DAVIS RETROACTIVE.
Defendants lean heavily on Utah's reliance18 on the practice
of twenty-two other states who taxed federal retirees while
exempting their own retirees. Defendants contend that Davis
new rule of law because Davis

interrupted this "practice".

prior practice, contends Utah, was the "prior law".

was a
This

Df bf pp. 50

and 62.
But,

Defendants

decisional law.
law.

Davis

confuse

the

challenged

practice

with

declared this practice to violate federal

The prior law by which the practice was tested was § 111

which had not changed since its enactment in 1939.

Defendants

mistake the law changing issue when they claim that twenty-two
other legislatives created prior law.

The issue is:

Did

Davis

change federal law in its interpretation of § 111? The answer is:
It did not. It applied basic statutory interpretation rules older
than § 111 itself, rules which are followed by the courts of all
fifty states.

18

"Reliance" is used loosely. Utah enacted the exemption
for its own retirees in 1947 (Utah Laws 1947 C. 131, § 13). Other
states appear to have followed Utah. (See, e.g., New Mexico NMSA
§ 10-11-145 enacted in 1953; Virginia (Code of Va. § 51-111.15
enacted in 1952); Missouri (Mo. Statutes § 104.540 enacted in
1957). A review of the federal retiree litigation in the various
states shows it to be a common theme for each state to argue "the
others violated § 111 first".
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State

legislatures

do

congressional legislation.
Liquor
Inc.

Corp.,
v. Crisp,

not

have

See: Hostetter

the

power

to

v. Idlewild

377 U.S. 324, 331-332 (1964); Capital

override

Bon Voyage

Cities

Cable,

467 U.S. 691 (1984). Reliance on state legislation

without one interpreting decision19 (did the other states, like
Utah, simply not see § 111?) to contradict a plain unambiguous
federal statute is manifestly unreasonable reliance.

As the trial

court observed,
Defendants do not claim to have relied on their own contrary
reading of § 111. Indeed, the real surprise to the State
seems to have been the existence of § 111, not its
interpretation. Reliance on the practice of twenty-two other
states, if indeed Utah did so rely, is not the type of
reliance protected by the federal retroactivity doctrine. No
person and no government can be excused by ignorance of the
law, even widespread ignorance.
Conclusions of Law, pp. 18-19, R. 1136, 1137.
VI. HOLDING DAVIS TO BE RETROACTIVE WOULD NOT RELIEVE THE COURT OF
ITS DUTY TO CONSTRUE 5 H I UNDER PRIOR LAW.
Retroactivity is a rule of "stare decisis11 only.

The U.S.

Supreme Court stated in ATA:
When the Court concludes that a law-changing decision should
not be applied retroactively . . . [l]ower courts considering
the applicability of the new decision to pending cases are
then instructed as follows:
If the operative conduct or
events occurred before the law-changing decision, a court
should apply the law prevailing at the time of the conduct.

1V

Defendants stand on sand compared to the litigants in
Beam, who thought they could stand on the rock of a prior decision
from their own Georgia Supreme Court declaring their tax to be
legal.
See: Beajn v. Georgia,
382 S.E. 2d 95, 97 (Ga. 1989).
Still, the U.S. Supreme Court's invalidation of their tax was
retroactive.
-39-

Id.

at 2338.
Defendants point to the practice of twenty-two other states in

taxing federal retirees while exempting state retirees as the
"prior law".

However, the practice of the states is not relevant

to the legal interpretation of § 111, a statute which Davis

held to

be plain and unambiguous.20
Even without the precedential effect of Davis,

the trial court

would not have been relieved of its duty to interpret § 111. Thus,
the trial court did interpret Davis,

and concluded that its plain

meaning invalidated Utah's taxing scheme.

See:

Conclusions of

Law, pp. 9-11, R. 1127-1129.
VII. UTAH'S SPECIFIC STATUTORY REMEDY FOR INCOME TAX REFUNDS IS
PLAINTIFFS' PROPER REMEDY.
A. UTAH HAS ADOPTED A REMEDY FOR INCOME TAX REFUNDS
PATTERNED AFTER THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM.
"An honorable government would not keep taxes to which it is
not entitled, and the legislative scheme supports that result."
Pittsburgh
1989).

& Midway Coal v.

Dept.

of Rev.,

776 P.2d 1061 (Ariz.

Utah, like Arizona, has also adopted a legislative scheme

which mandates refunds of takes which the state has collected and
to which it is not entitled.

20

Defendants1 claim of "a strong basis for reliance" on
Christensen
v. Tax Commission,
591 P. 2d 445 (Utah 1979) is
misplaced.
Df bf p. 41. The case addressed the distinction
between an exemption and a deduction in light of Utah's exemption
of state retirement income. By no stretch of the imagination was
the Court presented with a challenge to the legality of the tax
scheme under federal law.
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When Utah adopted an individual income tax in 1931 (Laws of
Utah 1931, Ch. 44) , it followed much of the federal income tax
system and continued to amend its law to keep pace with changes in
the federal tax system.
Based Income Tax Act,
In

1970,

Utah

(See: Backman, Utah's

Proposed

Federally-

1971 Utah L. Rev. 493).
amended

its

constitution

to

allow

full

incorporation by reference of federal tax law and procedure into
Utah tax law, a procedure now followed by almost all states. Utah
Constitution, Art. XIII § 12.

This full

incorporation was

accomplished by the Utah Individual Income Tax Act of 1973, now
U.C.A. § 59-10-101 et. seq.21 Among the provisions of the new Act
was a remedy for "refund of overpayments", patterned after federal
tax law.
Exhibit 4.

U.C.A. § 59-10-529 (as amended 1973).

See Addendum

Compare with I.R.C. § 6511 (1954 Code as amended).

Utahfs income tax refund statute provides for refund of any
"overpayment" of income taxes upon the filing of a return or
claim22 within three years of the due date of the return:

21

The result of this simplification is that the State is
"piggybacked" onto the federal system and the Utah Tax Commission
handles "very few" state income tax matters. (Deposition of Jerry
Larrabee, Appeals Supervisor, Utah State Tax Commission, R. 1161,
p. 8).
22

The Commission designed a special form for use by federal
retirees in this case. See: Exh. 2. The purpose of this form was
to protect the rights of class members without requiring the
expense and trouble of an amended return before determination of
the legal issues in this appeal.
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(1) In cases where there has been an overpayment of any tax
imposed by this chapter . . .
* * *

(6)
Any balance
taxpayer.

shall be refunded

immediately

to the

U.C.A. § 59-10-529(1) and (6) .23
This statutory remedy is the clear legislative scheme for
refunds of all income taxes.

It should be enforced.

As the Utah

Supreme Court has said:
It certainly would be a delusion to require a taxpayer to pay
the tax, seek a review, and if he prevails, not allow him to
get it back. The most elemental principles of justice dictate
the implication that if he pays the tax and follows the
procedure set out in the Sales Tax Act, and is sustained in
his contention that the tax is unlawful, it must be refunded.
(emphasis added).
Pacific

Intermountain

Express

v.

State

Tax Commission,

7 Utah 2d

15, 315 P.2d 549, 552 (1957).
B. DEFENDANTS DO NOT DENY THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE COMPLIED WITH
THE REFUND PROVISIONS OF § 59-10-529 OR THAT ITS REMEDY
APPLIES TO PLAINTIFFS, YET THEY RAISE AN OLD PROTEST REMEDY AS
PLAINTIFFS' SOLE REMEDY.
Defendants do not deny Plaintiffs1 compliance with the income
tax refund statute, U.C.A. § 59-10-529, either by the individual
members of the class who filed 55,000 claims, R. 606, or by class
representatives who filed class claims for refund on behalf of the
class.

R. 456-463, 593.

When answering Plaintiffs1 Amended

The full text of § 59-10-529 is included at Addendum Exh.
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Complaint, Defendants admitted class representatives filed claims
in behalf of the class.24
Neither do Defendants deny that the income tax refund remedy
(§ 529) applies to Plaintiffs1 federal retiree claims.

To the

contrary, every public communication from the Commission has urged
federal retirees to protect their rights to refunds under § 529.
R. 130, 916-934.

For this purpose, the Commission designed and

circulated a special simplified claim form used by thousands of
federal retirees and by the class to "protect their rights" in the
event Utah's law was invalidated by the courts. R. 1163, p. 26, R.
593.

See Addendum Exh. 2. In announcing its simplified form, the

Commission reminded retirees of the three year claim period of the
refund statute.

(Tax Bulletin 2/90, R. 930, Addendum Exh. 3; see

also Conclusions of Law, R. 1131).

When it appeared that many

retirees had missed the three year period for refunds of their 1985
taxes under § 529 because of confusion as to their rights and
remedies (some even filed claims for a refund on napkins, which the
Commission accepted.

R. 1163, p. 26), the Utah Legislature, with

encouragement from the Commission, extended the 1985 claim period
to April 16, 1990.

1990 Utah Laws, Ch. 21 §§ 1 to 3, effective

24

Plaintiffs alleged in paragraph 16 of their Amended
Complaint:
"Plaintiffs have filed claims for tax refunds with
Defendants on behalf of the Plaintiffs and all others similarly
situated for the years 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988." Defendants
admitted this allegation. R. 88, 257.
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February 21, 1990.25 This Act had the express purpose of extending
the three year limit for claims under § 59-10-529(7) for the 1985
tax year to allow Plaintiffs "access to the refund adjudication
process."

Id.

Therefore, Defendants claim that the protest

statute is Plaintiffs' sole remedy contradicts the views of the
legislature and the Commission.
Even

the

Commission's

continuing

insistence

on

its

jurisdiction to decide refund claims under § 529 testifies of its
clear application to Plaintiffs.

"The administrative remedies

provided at U.C.A. § 59-10-531 through 535 are complete, adequate
and speedy". Df bf p. 31. Undaunted, Defendants still assert the
payment under protest provisions of the old protest statute (§ 591-301) found among the miscellaneous sections of tax code to be
Plaintiffs' sole remedy, with its six month limitation for tax paid
under protest (§ 78-12-31).

Df bf pp. 25-26.

25

The full text of the law reads:
"Notwithstanding the general provisions of Subsection 59-10529(7), the filing deadline for persons claiming personal income
tax refunds for tax year 1985 based on the U.S. Supreme Court
decision Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury,
109 S.Ct. 1500
(March 28, 1989), is extended to April 16, 1990.
This act addresses only questions of access to the refund
adjudication process caused by the timing of the Davis v.
Michigan
decision. It does not affect the merits of any pending or future
refund litigation.
In enacting this law, the Legislature does not waive any legal
right, claim, or defense of the state, its officers, or its
employees; nor does the Legislature acknowledge or admit any legal
obligation or liability in connection with the pending or future
appeals or litigation arising from the decision in Davis
v.
Michigan.
Laws 1990, Ch. 21. (emphasis added).
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C.
PR0TEST8 ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR REFUNDS OF INCOME TAX
"OVERPAYMENTS".
With its incorporation of federal tax law and procedure26,
Utah has adopted a system which rejected a protest requirement for
income taxes more than sixty years ago. In Moore Ice Cream Co. v.
Rose,
the

289 U.S. 373 (1933), after the federal government repealed
law requiring

payments under protest, litigation

ensued

regarding the date the law became effective. With reference to the
protest requirement the U.S. Supreme Court said,
In this situation the Government was unjustly enriched at the
expense of the taxpayer when it held onto monies that had been
illegally collected, whether with protest or without. So at
least the lawmakers believed, and gave expression to that
belief, not only in the statute, but in Congressional reports.
Senate Report, No. 398, 68th Congress, First Session, pp. 44,
45;27
26

Incorporation of federal tax law and procedure has the
express purpose to "conform to the extent practicable, certain of
the existing rules of procedure under and for the administration of
Utah's individual income tax law to corresponding rules of
administration and procedure described by federal income tax laws,
with a view to the reduction of effect, promotion of better
understanding of requirements and a greater consistency between
state and federal procedures and administration.11 U.C.A. § 59-10102 (emphasis added).
See also:
Christensen
v. State
Tax
Commission,
591 P.2d 445, 448 (Utah 1979) (the main purpose of
incorporating federal income tax law into Utah law is to make the
forms and procedures consistent).
27

"The U.S. Senate Report contained the following:
Section 1114. The provisions of Section 1318 of existing law
have been amended to provide that after the enactment of the bill
it shall not be a condition precedent to the maintenance of a suit
to recover taxes, sums or penalties paid, that such amounts shall
have been paid under protest or duress. The fact protest was made
has little bearing on the question whether the tax was properly or
erroneously assessed.
The making of such a protest becomes a
formality so far as well advised taxpayers are concerned and the
requirement of it may operate to deny the just claim of a taxpayer
-45-

Id.

at 378.
Commenting

requirement

on

how

corrected

the

what

new
the

law
court

repealing
felt

to

the
be

a

protest
serious

injustice, the Court said:
A high-minded Government renounced an advantage that was felt
to be ignoble, and set up a new standard of equity and
conscience. There was no thought to discriminate between
payments made and those to come. A fine sense of honor had
brought the statute into being.
We are to read it in a
kindred spirit.
Id. at 379.
The Arizona Supreme Court similarly rejects a rule requiring
a protest for the recovery of tax refunds.
We know of no good purpose served by such a rule. It is
argued that the "under protest" requirement puts the taxing
authority on notice that it might not be able to keep the tax,
and therefore, it could hold the tax and not spend it until
the matter is ultimately determined. But in this case, the
state has conceded that this abstract reason for the rule does
not apply. The state has not relied on these tax payments to
its detriment.
Moreover, the rule would promote a senseless practice. All
taxpayers would be advised to pay all taxes "under protest"
just to cover themselves. It is not likely that the state or
any other taxing entity would hold all such taxes in abeyance
pending future resolution.
Pittsburgh

& Midway Coal

v.

Dept.

of Rev.,

776 P.2d 1061, 1063

(Ariz. 1989).
The protest rule especially makes no sense in the payment of
income

taxes.

Because

almost

all

taxes

are

collected

by

withholding, the employee probably never knows when the tax is

who was not well informed."

Moore Ice Cream at 378.
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submitted.
would

To whom should a protest be made and how often?

note the protest among millions

of

Who

computer-processed

returns? This is not the case where a taxpayer delivers a check to
a revenue agent along with a letter of protest and then waits for
a phone call from the local tax authority.
Federal tax law resolved the protest issue long ago; Utah was
well advised when it incorporated the federal system.
D.
REFUNDS OF INCOME TAX "OVERPAYMENTS1' UNDER 5 59-10-529
INCLUDE TAXES UNLAWFULLY COLLECTED.
With

its

definitions

statutory

and

incorporation

procedures,

definition of "overpayment".28

Utah

of

federal

incorporates

income tax
the

federal

The federal definition of the word

"overpayment" was at issue in Jones

v. Liberty

Glass

Company, 332

U.S. 524 (1948) , when a taxpayer brought suit to recover a payment
of income tax alleged to have been illegally assessed.

The U.S.

Supreme Court defined tax "overpayment" to include those tax
payments made as a result of error in law:
In the absence of some contrary indication, we must assume
that the framers of these statutory provisions intended to
convey the ordinary meaning which is attached to the language
they used. See Rosenman v. United States,
323 U.S. 658, 661,
89 L.Ed. 535, 539, 65 S.Ct. 536. Hence we read the word
"overpayment" in its usual sense, as meaning any payment in
excess of that which is properly due. Such an excess payment
may be traced to an error in mathematics or in judgment or in
interpretation of facts or law.
And the error may be
committed by the taxpayer or by the revenue agents. Whatever
28

"Any term used in this chapter has the same meaning as
when used in comparable context in the laws of the United States
relating to federal income taxes unless a different meaning is
clearly required." U.C.A. § 59-10-103(2).
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the reason, the payment of more than is rightfully due is what
characterizes an overpayment. (emphasis added).

Liberty

Glass at 531.

The holding of Liberty
(1954 Code) .

Glass

is codified in I.R.C. § 6401(c)

The Utah counterpart reads:

"If there is no tax

liability for a period in which an amount is paid as income tax,
the amount is an overpayment."

U.C.A. § 59-10-529(12).

Under any characterization, retroactive invalidation of Utahfs
tax on federal retirees for the years 1985-1988 is a ruling on tax
liability.

See:

Conclusions of Law, R. 1131, 1132, pp. 13-14.

The Commission recognizes the breadth of the "overpayment"
definition and treats as an overpayment any amount not properly
due.

An overpayment is simply a mathematical calculation between

what the taxpayer paid and what he should have paid.

Depo. of

Commission Chairman Richard Hansen, R. 1159, pp. 21-22.

"I donft

know that it (the definition of overpayment) would even be an
issue." Id.

at 22. Commissioner Roger Tew agrees that the reasons

for the overpayment are irrelevant.
[I]t really has been a non-issue. . . the term "overpayment"
is probably generic and that's how we have approached that.
If you were entitled to a refund of your ultimate tax
liability, it is established to be less than the amount that
you paid in, we entered the provisions for a refund decision,
but. . . I am unaware of any case that we have had before us
where that has ever been raised as an issue. . . in the income
tax area.
Depo. of Roger Tew, Tax Commissioner, R. 1163, p. 28.
The Supreme Court of Colorado recently decided its federal
retiree refund case by ordering refunds. When asked to avoid the
-48-

statutory remedy for refunds of income tax overpayments, the Court
refused:
The plain reading, and only reasonable interpretation, of [the
refund statutes] is that the General Assembly intended to
refund any tax illegally collected under U.C.A. § 39-22104(4)(g) to the affected taxpayers. Faced with such plain
legislative intent, it is both unnecessary and outside our
judicial role to look to whether refunds are good policy or
whether a balancing test, such as Chevron, favors retroactive
or prospective application of our holding that U.C.A. § 39-22104(4)(g) was unconstitutional.
Kuhn v. State

Dept.

of Revenue,

817 P.2d 101, 110 (Colo. 1991).

E.
UNDER UTAH LAW, THE PROTEST REMEDY HAS NO APPLICATION
WHERE A MORE SPECIFIC STATUTORY REMEDY EXISTS AND AN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IS ESTABLISHED.
Defendants1 view of the protest statute as Plaintiffs1 sole
remedy is contrary to the holding and position taken by the
Commission

in Pacific

Intermountain

Express

Co.

v.

State

Tax

Commission,

7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957). There, the taxpayer

paid allegedly unlawful sales taxes under protest and filed an
action directly in district court in reliance on the protest
statute, U.C.A. § 59-11-11 (1953) (now renumbered at U.C.A. § 59-1301) .

The Commission moved to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, raising the more specific sales tax remedy to be Plaintiffs'
exclusive remedy. The trial court agreed and dismissed the protest
complaint; the Utah Supreme Court upheld the dismissal.
In its opinion, the Court compared the protest and sales tax
remedies.

-49

It is to be noted that U.C.A. § 59-11-1129 is of ancient
origin. It has existed in our law since statehood, and sets
out the historical method of contesting payment of taxes. It
is general in its terms; has usually been applied to disputes
over property taxes and is found in the "miscellaneous"
provision of the tax code. On the other hand, § 59-15-12 to
15, upon which the Tax Commission relied, are of more recent
origin, being part of the Sales Tax Act itself which was
enacted in 1933; and are explicit as to the manner in which a
taxpayer dissatisfied with a sales tax assessment may
challenge it.
Id.

at 551.
The Commission correctly argued that the more specific sales

tax act must control over the general protest remedy.
. . . supporting this view are the basic rules pertaining to
statutory construction: that in case of conflict, a later
enactment is controlling over an earlier one; and that express
provisions of statutes take preference over general ones.
Id.

at 551.
Now, Defendants make the same arguments rejected in

Intermountain

Express.

Pacific

They claim § 59-1-301, enacted in 1898 (Df

bf p. 22) , and found among the "Miscellaneous Provisions" of the
Tax Code, should control over the specific refund provisions of the
Income Tax Act, enacted in 1973. § 59-10-529. But, Utah continues
to follow the rule that new statutes, when relating to the same
subject matter as existing statues, are

29

"deemed controlling as it

Section 59-11-11 has been renumbered as § 59-1-301, but
the protest statute remains virtually unchanged.
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is a later expression of the Legislature," Ellis
Retirement

v.

Utah

State

757 P.2d 882, 884, 885 (Utah App. 1988)30.

Bd.,

Defendants raise what they claim to be a contrary rule in
State

v. District

Court,

v. Tax Commission,

102 Utah 290, 115 P.2d 913 (1941) and Shea

101 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274 (1941).

Both cases

involved refunds for diesel fuel taxes invalidated in Carter
State

Tax Commission,
In the State

v.

98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 727 (1939).

case, the taxpayer had actually paid the fuel

taxes under protest and the court was determining the appropriate
statute of limitations.

Even though the protest statute clearly

required a six (6) month limitation, the court was badly divided.
A two Justice plurality reluctantly applied the six month statute
only because:

1) no other statutory remedy was provided for fuel

tax refunds, and 2) the shorter statute helped resolve a "cloud on
the right of the state to use taxes" paid under protest because the

30

If the Utah Legislature had intended the protest statute
to be the sole remedy for unlawfully collected income taxes, or if
it had any dispute with the application of specific tax remedies
over the general protest remedy, it missed a perfect opportunity
when it completely revised Title 59 in 1987. Among the many
changes made (see Appendix A to Title 59 showing 1987 revisions),
the legislature added a remedy (59-13-202) to the Motor Fuel Tax
Act, moved the protest remedy (59-11-11) to the property tax act
(59-2-101 et seq; protest renumbered as 59-2-141), and made
stylistic changes in the wording of the income tax refund remedy.
Laws of Utah 1987, Chapters 2 through 6. The legislature missed
another opportunity in 1988 when it removed the protest remedy from
the Property Tax Act and placed it back in the miscellaneous tax
provisions (renumbered as 59-1-301), in apparent recognition that
the Property Tax Act already included a specific remedy (59-2-1313)
while chapters imposing other taxes had no remedy. Laws of Utah
1988 Ch. 3 § 88.
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office collecting them was required to segregate all funds paid
under protest until the dispute was resolved.
opinion

agreed

only

because

the

statutory

The concurring
requirement

for

segregating funds favored a short statute. Two Justices dissented.
Id.

at 915 and 916.
State

is distinguishable because income taxes are not fuel

taxes and no segregation of income taxes is required. § 59-10-101,
et seq.31
In Shea,

the plaintiffs had not paid the fuel taxes under

protest, and the Court attempted to find another remedy in the
wording of the fuel tax statute authorizing the rcrturn of any fuel
taxes "collected through error." The Court found the word "error"
was too narrow to encompass unlawful collections.

The Court held

the protest statute to be the exclusive remedy for refunds of
unlawful fuel taxes because no alternative remedy existed.
These cases do not conflict with the later (1957) rule of
Pacific

Intermountain

Express,

supra.

State

and Shea dealt with

diesel fuel taxes collected under a statute allowing no other clear
remedy.

The Court

in Pacific

Intermountain

Express,

supra,

addressed the issue of two apparent and conflicting remedies. When
two remedies are apparent, the more specific later enactment
applies.

Id.

31

Utah has not segregated Plaintiffs1 income tax payments.
Depo. of Roger Tew. R. 1163, p. 37.
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Though the protest remedy continues to apply to taxes with no
administrative remedies for refunds,32 it cannot apply to defeat
claims under the clear income tax refund provisions of § 59-10-529.
P.
UTAH HAS NEVER REQUIRED PAYMENT UNDER PROTEST FOR INCOME
TAX REFUNDS; TO DO SO NOW WOULD BE UNFAIR.
Defendants cannot show one example of a protest requirement
being raised as a bar in Utah to an income tax refund.

The issue

is not raised by the Commission, which has not applied protest
requirements to income tax challenges:
Q.
In the income tax context, have you ever barred a refund
to a taxpayer because the taxpayer failed to pay under protest?
A.
Not to my knowledge. I donft — when I say that, I don't
remember it coming up, the question of whether paid under
protest or not. The cases that I have been involved in has
been a matter of looking as to whether or not^ they owed it.
The question of whether it was paid under protest has not been
an issue.
Depo. of Richard Hanson, Tax Commission Chairman, R. 1159, pp. 2223.
Like the federal system, Utah offers a three year period in
which either the state or the taxpayer can change the calculations
on the original income tax return for any justifiable reason.
U.C.A. §§ 59-10-529, 536.
As this Court has said:

32

Those taxes imposed in Title 59 which offer no specific
refund remedy include the: equivalent property tax (59-3-101 et.
seq.), privilege tax (59-4-101 et. seq.), gross receipts tax (59-8101 et. seq.), admitted insurers tax (59-9-101 et. seq.), cigarette
and tobacco tax (59-14-101 et. seq.), educational funding tax (5914c-101 et. seq.) and wine and liquor tax (59-16-1 et. seq.).
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It certainly would be a delusion to require a taxpayer to pay
the tax, seek a review, and if he prevails, not allow him to
get it back. (emphasis added)

Pacific

Intermountain

at 552.

6.
THE EXISTENCE OF NO PROTEST REMEDY IN 1987 BELIES
DEFENDANTS' CLAIM THAT IT WAS AND IS PLAINTIFFS' SOLE REMEDY.
As Defendants concede, the legislature in 1987 removed the
payment under protest statute, U.C.A. § 59-11-11 (1977) from the
miscellaneous section of the tax code and placed it in the Property
Tax Act.

Df bf p.22, ftnt 1.

In 1988, the legislature again

placed a payment under protest remedy among the miscellaneous tax
provisions but also left the protest remedy intact in the Property
Tax Code.

Thus, no payment under protest remedy existed for the

1987 tax year except in connection with the payment of property
taxes.

Plaintiffs1 only remedy for 1987 is a claim for refund

under U.C.A. § 57-10-529.

This action of the legislature is

unexplainable if it viewed the protest remedy to be Plaintiffs'
sole remedy.
H.
PAYMENT UNDER PROTEST IS AN ALTERNATE REMEDY FOR THE 1988
TAX YEAR. PLAINTIFFS PAID TAXES UNDER PROTEST IN 1988.
As a precaution, Plaintiffs both protested the 1988 collection
of taxes and claimed a refund under the normal income tax refund
procedures in § 59-10-529.

Defendants have never objected to

Plaintiffs1 protest claim and the trial court allowed a refund
under either or both sections.
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No particular form of tax protest is required
Murdock v. Murdock,

in Utah.

113 P. 330 (Utah 1911) sets forth the standard

to which a tax protest must conform:
No particular form of protest is required by the statute. Nor
is it required that a protest be in writing. From the facts
as admitted by the treasurer, she clearly understood that the
portion of the taxes which were claimed by Heber City were
paid under protest because they were claimed to be illegal for
the reason that the sheep upon which they were levied at no
time were within the territorial limits of said city. What
more could be required?
When the statute prescribes no
special conditions in making a protest, it would seem that the
courts can require none.
Id.

at p. 332.
The purpose of requiring payment under protest is to alert

public officials of a challenge to the amount of revenue they may
receive and thus have available to budget, which may make sense in
a property tax context, but serves no purpose in an income tax
setting.33

But "where there was an existing controversy, known

to the public officials,.. .there is no question but that the tax
collecting authorities had knowledge of which tax the 'paid under
protest1 referred to."

Peterson

v. Bountiful

City,

477 P.2d 153,

156 (Utah 1970). The extensive attention given to the Davis ruling
by the press in March and April of 1989 and the Commission's public
response clearly indicate Defendants' awareness of the protest.
The Commission has consistently viewed filing an amended
return asking for a refund as tantamount to filing under protest.

The State of Utah does not attempt to segregate income
taxes paid under protest. R. 1163# p. 37.
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This is precisely the position taken by the Commission at trial.
Referring to the April 5, 1989 press release, defendants stated in
a memorandum filed with the trial court:
There has been no foreclosure of opportunity for refund. In
fact, the press release states that if any taxpayer disagrees
with the Commission's assessment, they may file their taxes
under protest to preserve any rights they may have, (emphasis
added).
R. 175.

The fact the press release said nothing about "paying

under protest" indicates the Commission recognized the filing of an
amended return as constituting payment under protest.
The Commission, having openly instructed Plaintiffs to file
amended tax returns to protect their legal rights and recognizing
the amended returns as a filing of taxes under protest, has
acknowledged Plaintiffs1 protest and should now be estopped from
denying that tax payments were made under protest for the 1988 tax
year by Plaintiffs.
I.

NEITHER LACHES OR WAIVER BAR PLAINTIFFSv CLAIMS.

Defendants assert the trial court erred
Plaintiffs1

claims by laches and waiver.

in not barring

Df bf pp. 44-47.

Defendants' assertions are without merit for the following reasons.
1.
Papanikolas

Defendants cannot show any injury they have suffered.
Brothers

Enter,

v. Sugarhouse

535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975).

Shopping

Center

Assoc,

Defendants have collected an

illegal tax for 40 years and have thus been enriched at the expense
of Plaintiffs.

No matter when in the last 40 years Plaintiffs

brought this action, they could claim a refund back three years.
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It would not have mattered if Plaintiffs had brought this action
twenty years ago.

Defendants have only benefitted by the extra

length of time they have collected illegal taxes.
2.

Laches is an equitable defense which "refuses to lend its
Rohr v. Rohr,

aid to a party whose conduct is inequitable."

709

P.2d 382 (Utah 1985). Since Defendants unlawfully collected taxes,
equity will not respond to their cry for help.
3.

Defendants cannot show lack of diligence on the part of

members of the Plaintiff class, Papanikolas

Brothers,

supra, unless

they can show how retirees, some whom did not even retire until
after 1985, could have brought a claim 20 or 30 years ago before
their claim was ripe.
4.

Defendants argue that because the language of § 111 was

clear, Plaintiffs were not diligent in challenging this statute
sooner. Defendants apparently argue there exists a higher standard
for taxpayers to study and analyze a clear tax law than exists for
the Commission itself.
5.

Laches or waiver should not defeat a specific clear

refund statute with a specific statute of limitation cutting off
the rights of taxpayers to obtain a refund.

In the statute, the

legislature has expressed the period during which inaction is
acceptable. Inaction standing alone should never defeat a cause of
action within the statutory period of limitations.
6.

To say that any one taxpayer by acting within the statute

of limitations caused the total burden to the state is a fallacy.
-57-

Any delay by one taxpayer cannot result in more than one refund.
Laches could only be addressed on an individual claim basis.
Defendants1 defenses of laches and waiver must fail.
VIII. DEFENDANTS IMPROPERLY ASK THE COURT TO CRAFT A NEW REMEDY IN
PLACE OF TAX REFUND STATUTES (BUT EQUITY FOLLOWS THE LAW) .
Defendants inexplicably ask this Court to apply the state
doctrine of retroactivity to relieve Utah from its statutory duty
to pay refunds even if Davis
bf pp. 84-89.

is retroactive under federal law. Df

That equity allows a court to deny stare

decisis

effect to its own law-reversing decisions is not disputed; but
here, Defendants urge the Court, in the guise of equity to deny
effect to a retroactive decision of the U.S. Supreme Court and to
emasculate Utah's tax refund statute because State Government would
rather spend Plaintiffs1 wages elsewhere.
Even if Utah had the power of selective secession from the
laws of the Union34; it could not re-define equity to nullify the
laws and Constitution of Utah, or the Constitution of the United
States.
A.
THE TAX REFUND STATUTE IS THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE OF
UTAH.
Defendants complain that federal minimum due process does not
mandate refunds, and that "Utah needs to do nothing more."
34

Df bf

Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal Union and the
Constitution of the United States is the "Supreme Law of the Land."
Utah Constitution,
Article 1, § 3. "The laws of the United States
are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the
citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are." Claflin
v.
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876).
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p. 85.

Defendants miss the point.

enacted tax refund statutes.

Utah HAS done more, it HAS

[cf. McKesson v. Florida,

110 S.Ct.

2238, 2258, ftnt 36). "The State is free, of course, to provide
broader relief as a matter of State law than is required by the
Federal Constitution." ].
All political power is inherent in the people . . . "

Utah

Constitution, Art. I, § 2, and the people have chosen through
elected

representatives

to

refund

income

taxes

improperly

collected. U.C.A. § 59-10-529. This is the voice of the people of
Utah and is their codification of equity.
B.
THE CONSTITUTION OP UTAH PROTECTS A CLEAR STATUTORY
REMEDY FROM EROSION BY POLITICAL EXPEDIENCE.
Defendants call the income tax refund statute "draconian" and
claim the district court "abused
refunds".

its discretion

in ordering

Df bf pp. 84-86.

Defendants would not claim abuse of discretion if this case
had involved only one or even a thousand claims. The refund remedy
is too plain and obvious to bar individual claims. What Defendants
mean when they call refunds "draconian" is that, this time, there
are too many taxpayers with too many claims.

The case is

politically uncomfortable and inexpedient, and Defendants hope the
court will carve an exception into the refund statute for big cases
involving too many claims.
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But, the tax refund statute applies the same whether a refund
is claimed by one taxpayer or by thirty-four thousand, and the Utah
Constitution will buttress the statutory remedy.
Utah's constitutionally mandated separation of powers, Utah
Constitution, Art. V, § 1 (more specific in the U.S. Constitution)
prohibits a court from acting in equity to carve exceptions in a
plain statute to meet hardship in a particular case; to do so would
be "a usurpation of legislative power". Smith v. Schwartz,
See also State

126, 60 P. 305 (1899).
P. 632 (1913); State

v.

Bishop,

v. Johnson,

21 Utah

44 Utah 18, 137

111 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986).

The

wisdom or policy of a tax statute does not concern the courts of
Utah.
Utah

Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 P. 1097 (1897); see also
Manufacturers

Ass'n.

v.

Stewart,

82 Utah 198, 23 P.2d 229

(1933) . There is no authority in government which can invalidate
a constitutional statute.
368, 57 P.l (1899); State

Kimball

ex rel.

v.

Breeden

Grantsville
v. Lewis,

City,

19 Utah

26 Utah 120, 72

P. 388 (1903).
Utahn's have a guaranteed "remedy by due course of law", Utah
Constitution, Art. I, § 11.

To the extent Defendants deny one

federal retiree a tax refund because there are too many others also
claiming refunds or because he is a member of a less deserving
group, they offend Utah's guarantees of equal protection and
uniform operation of laws. Utah Constitution, Art. I, §§ 2 and 24.
C.

FEDERAL DUE PROCESS DEMANDS A REMEDY.
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Once a constitutional decision applies and renders a state tax
invalid, due process, not equitable considerations, will
generally dictate the scope of relief offered.
ATA at 2339.
Defendants claim to have complied with federal due process by
providing pre-deprivation hearings, and therefore "need do nothing
more".

Df bf p.85.

But, Utah's pre-deprivation proceedings

require the payment of a tax before court review and are therefore
deficient.35

McKesson Corp.

v. Florida,

110 S.Ct. at 2251.

When a State penalizes taxpayers for failure to remit their
taxes in timely fashion, thus requiring them to pay first
before obtaining review of the tax's validity, federal due
process principles long recognized by our cases require the
State's post-deprivation procedure to provide a "clear and
certain remedy," O'Connor,
223 U.S. at 285, for the
deprivation of tax monies in an unconstitutional manner.
Id.

at 2258.
Our decision today in McKesson makes clear that once a state's
tax statute is held invalid under the Commerce Clause, the
state is obligated to provide relief consistent with federal
due process principles.

ATA at 2332.
Where a state can easily foresee the invalidation of its tax
statutes, its reliance interests may merit little concern.
Id.

at 2333.
The State's interest in financial stability does not justify
a refusal to provide relief.

McKesson at 2257.
35

Utah's pre-deprivation process requires a taxpayer to
raise claims of unlawful taxation before a Commission with no power
to declare the validity of laws; the taxpayer must pay the tax
before gaining access to a court empowered to grant a remedy.
U.C.A. S§ 59-1-501 through 505.
-61

We reject respondents' intimation that the cost of any refund
considered by the State might justify a decision to withhold
it. Just as a State may not object to an otherwise available
remedy providing for the return of real property unlawfully
taken or criminal fines unlawfully imposed simply because it
finds the property or monies useful, so also Florida cannot
object to a refund here just because it has other ideas about
how to spend the funds.
Id.

at 2557 (ftnt 35)
D.

EQUITY FOLLOWS THE LAW.

Defendants see the equities in their favor because "Utah
simply had no reason to doubt the validity of the exemption".
bf p. 62.
doubt,

Df

But, reading § 111 would have given them reason to

especially

in

view

of

Utahfs

settled

position

that

retirement benefits are deferred compensation. As the trial court
observed, "No person and no government can be excused by ignorance
of the law, even widespread ignorance." Conclusions of Law, p. 19,
R. 1137.
Defendants further urge the court to "balance the relative
benefit to any individual plaintiff . . . against the relative harm
to the state".

Df bf p. 63. One State Supreme Court Justice has

considered the equity posed by federal retiree tax refund claims:
I am unable to see the "inequity" involved in requiring the
State to return any money it has unconstitutionally taken from
the plaintiffs.
In my view, the fact that the State is
experiencing financial difficulties has little to do with
whether it would be inequitable to require the State to refund
the plaintiffs1 money.
Nothing in the record before us
indicates that the plaintiffs, federal pensioners and military
personnel, are experiencing any less financial difficulties
than the State of North Carolina. Further, unlike the State,
the plaintiffs do not have the power of taxation at their
disposal when attempting to deal with their financial
difficulties. There simply is nothing "inequitable" or wrong
-62-

about ordering that the State not pick a taxpayerfs pocket or
in requiring it to return the money when it is caught doing
so. I believe it is entirely equitable and just to apply the
rule announced in Davis retroactively so as to require that
the State return any taxes it has unconstitutionally collected
from the plaintiffs.
Swanson v. State,

407 S.E. 2d 791, 797 (N.C. 1991) (Dissent by J.

Mitchell, joined by C.J. Exum and J. Frye) (the majority noted only
that the state was in "dire financial straits" and that refunds
would therefore be inequitable.

Id.

at 794.)

Defendants also unfairly ask a single taxpayer's need for
return of his money to be weighed against the statefs obligation to
all class members.

The proper balancing must weigh a refund to a

taxpayer against the cost to the state of that single refund. This
is NOT one large case; this is thirty-four thousand small cases.
Taken to its conclusion, Defendants' argument is that if the
state unlawfully taxes a sufficiently large number of taxpayers, it
should be excused.
Defendants argue, using figures stricken by the trial court as
irrelevant,

that the cost of nearly

$104 million

(a figure

Plaintiffs believe to be much, much too high) would create a
financial hardship to the State. (This also assumes that all class
members will claim their refund, a fact disproved in those states
in which federal retiree refunds have been given).

Defendants'

numbers are impressive in a vacuum, but would amount to only 2.7%
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of the Statefs $3.8 billion 1992 budget.36
smaller

than

the

margin

of

accuracy

in

This percentage is
the

state

budget

projections. Defendants1 conclusions about the cutback of services
and

"staggering"

tax

increases

are

also

pure

speculation.

(Plaintiffs also contest Defendants1 assertion that the State has
current fiscal problems.

Id.

Fiscal problems are relative, of

course, and invite a comparison to the fiscal problems of retirees
on fixed incomes).
As Defendants suggest, a comparison of the relative benefit to
each taxpayer with the burden to the state is (though unfair)
illuminating.

Defendants1 figures (for 1988) yield an average

refund of about $478.00 per year per taxpayer.37

For a taxpayer

on a fixed retirement of $20,000.00 per year, the unlawful taxes he
or she paid and wants back for four years amounts to more than 2.7%
of his or her annual income. The 2.7% impact on the State is small
relative to the impact on the taxpayer.

In relative terms, the

total cost of refunds to the State of 2.7% of its annual budget is
equivalent to $540.00 in a $20,000.00 income. Unpleasant, yes, but
not financially devastating.

36

Plaintiffs request judicial notice of Utahfs 1992 budget
of $3.8 billion, with a $34 million surplus from 1991 and a $56.7
million "rainy-day fund". See, e.g., Deseret News Article, "Utahfs
Finances in Good Shape as National Economy Struggles", January 6-7,
1992, p. D5.
37

See:

footnote 40.
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What can be fairly said is that the State has other places it
would rather spend the money it has unlawfully collected.

But, a

taxpayer on a fixed income also has other needs he or she would
prefer to spend money on than to pay unlawful taxes.

The fulcrum

for the decision is not what the state would rather do, but what it
must do.
Defendants see inequity in asking other taxpayers in Utah to
absorb the cost of retiree refunds. Plaintiffs see in this result
the fairness that should have existed at the time of taxation.
Asking Utah to spread its tax burden to those who should have paid
the cost in the first place is not inequitable, it is just.

And,

it should not be forgotten that other taxpayers in Utah have reaped
the benefit of unlawful taxes on federal retirees since enactment
of the law in 1947.
Utah's argument of the inequity of requiring it to honor its
tax refund obligations is reminiscent of the many divorced fathers
who appear in court every week arguing that they should not have to
pay child support because they have re-married and their new family
needs the money more.
Nothing has been said about the cost to the State of failing
to restore what it has unlawfully taken.

Equity considers more

than money, and the cost to the state in avoiding its obligation is
much greater than money.

Equity should concern itself with the

loss of confidence and respect for law by those who must pay the
State's bills, the taxpayers.

Should not they be left with
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confidence that, if the State has improperly taxed their income,
the State will give it back?
No honorable government would keep taxes to which it is not
entitled, and the legislative scheme supports that result.
Pittsburgh

& Midway Coal v. Dept.

of Revenue,

776 P.2d 1061 (Ariz.

1989) .
In the best and final sense, equity is what the people of Utah
have provided:

income tax refunds.

"equity follows the law." Protrka
467 (1967); Jarvis
(1970); Independent
of Teachers,
IX.

v. State

v. Palmer,

Land Dept.,

School Dist.

Where rights are settled,
423 P.2d 514, 246 Or.

479 P.2d 169, 106 Ariz. 506

No. 89 v. Oklahoma City

Federation

612 P.2d 719 (Okla. 1980).

THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO GRANT THE RELIEF SOUGHT
AND PROPERLY WAIVED EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
A.
THE COURT'S JURISDICTION IS BEST DETERMINED BY THE RELIEF
SOUGHT.
Plaintiffs filed refund claims with the Commission.

When

these were denied and the Commission's public position was clear,
Plaintiffs filed a class action for declaratory relief. With this
case pending, the Commission continued administrative action on
refund

claims.

Plaintiffs

sought

relief

from

further

administrative remedies under U.C.A. § 63-46b-14 and the court so
ordered. R. 251. Ignoring this order, the Commission attempted to
compel

five class members to participate

addressing the retroactivity of the Davis

in formal hearings

decision.

These five

objected and petitioned for an injunction enforcing the court order
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that members of the class need not exhaust administrative remedies.
R. 292.

The Commission objects that the court meddled in its

affairs.
The Court prefaced

its consideration of jurisdiction by

describing the relief sought:
Plaintiffs claim tax refunds for the tax years 1985, 1986,
1987 and 1988 on the basis of overpayment under U.C.A. § 5910-529(7). Plaintiffs pray for 1) a declaratory order that
Utah's taxation of federal retirees was unlawful for all tax
years in dispute, and 2) an order compelling Defendants to
recognize Plaintiffs' class claims for refund, and to compute
and pay refunds.
Conclusions of Law, p. 7, R. 1125. Defendants do not dispute this.
Defendants do not challenge the Court's jurisdiction to review
Plaintiffs' claims that the 1988 taxes were paid under protest and
should be refunded under U.C.A. § 59-1-301; neither do they
challenge the Court's authority to certify a class action.
Defendants challenge the trial Court's jurisdiction on only
two grounds:

1) jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief, and 2)

jurisdiction to issue an order compelling action by the Commission
(mandamus).

Df bf p. 36.

B.
THE DISTRICT
DECLARATORY ORDER.

COURT

HAS

JURISDICTION

TO

ISSUE

A

The District Court has jurisdiction to determine the validity
of the tax, the availability of refunds, the propriety of the
class claims for refund and to issue a declaratory order
resolving those issues pursuant to the Utah Declaratory
Judgment Act.
Conclusions of Law, p. 7, R. 1125.
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The District Court's jurisdiction is broad.

"The district

court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal,
not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by law."
U.C.A. § 78-3-4 (as amended 1988).

The District Court's authority

to issue declaratory orders is protected under the Utah Declaratory
Judgment Act, U.C.A. § 78-33-1 et seq. U.C.A. § 78-33-1 provides:
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions
shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal
relations, whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed. No action or proceedings shall be open to objection
on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed
for.38
Section 78-33-2 provides:
Any person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations
are effected by a statute . . . may have determined any
question of construction or validity arising under the . . .
statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or
other legal relations thereunder.
On this issue, Defendants take a position contrary to that
taken by the Utah Tax Commission in Washington
Commission,

103 Ut. 73, 133 P.2d 564 (1943).

County v. State

Tax

In that case, the

taxpayers claimed a statute giving a tax exemption to irrigation
properties to be unconstitutional. The taxpayer filed an original

38

Defendants cite this statute for the proposition that a
district court has such power only "within its respective
jurisdiction." Df bf p. 36. They do not see the statute as the
grant of jurisdiction it is. Evidently, this circuitous reasoning
arises from a typographical error in Defendant's quotation of the
statute.
The qualifying term
"within their respective
jurisdictions" has obvious reference to the geographical
jurisdictions (venues) of the individual districts, since all have
the same subject matter jurisdiction.
Defendants have misread
"jurisdictions" to be in the singular.
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proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition in the Utah Supreme Court,
alleging the Commission to be without authority to apply a statute
which is unconstitutional.

Id.

at 565. The Supreme Court agreed

that "the Commission has the authority to apply (the statute) only
if that section is constitutional."

Id.

at 565.

The Court then

reviewed other remedies available to the taxpayer to determine the
legality of the tax.

The Commission argued "that the petitioners

have an adequate remedy under the declaratory judgment statutes or
by injunction" to contest validity of the tax in district court.
Id.

at 566.
The

Court

agreed

that the first two provisions

of the

Declaratory Judgment Act (now U.C.A. § 68-33-1 and 2):
do expressly authorize district courts to determine the
validity of statutes which affect the rights, status, or other
legal relations of the person bringing the action.
The court saw, however, unfairness in requiring the taxpayers
to seek a declaratory order in District Court because:
the Commission could proceed pursuant to [the challenged
statute] while the declaratory action was pending. Thus, the
petitioner might be injured, even though they prevailed in the
declaratory judgment proceeding.
Id.

at 566.
Because of this unfairness and possible prejudice to the

taxpayers in being forced to litigate their claims in both the
district court and the Commission, the Supreme Court decided the
issue. Id.

at 566. The Court's jurisdiction to grant declaratory

relief is to be liberally construed with the purpose of settling
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and affording "relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect
to rights. . ." U.C.A. § 78-33-12.
A declaratory action in district court is a long established
method in Utah for contesting unlawful taxes.
Line v. State

See:

Crystal

Car

Tax Comm'n, 174 P.2d 984 (1946) (all claimants should

be joined if possible).
C.
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO COMPEL ACTION BY
THE COMMISSION (MANDAMUS) .
In addition to an order declaring Utah's tax scheme to be
unlawful, Plaintiffs sought an order compelling the Commission "to
recognize Plaintiff's class claims for refund, and to compute and
pay refunds."

Conclusions of Law, p. 7, R. 1125.

The trial court described the basis for its jurisdiction:
Jurisdiction in the District Court to compel action by an
administrative agency through writ of mandamus is protected by
Art. VIII, § 5 of the Utah Constitution which provides the
"district court shall have original jurisdiction in all
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute,
and power to issue all extraordinary writs."
This is
recognized in U.C.A. § 78-3-4 which gives district court
judges "power to issue all extraordinary writs necessary to
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
Conclusions of Law, p. 8, R. 1126.
The court also has jurisdiction to supplement its declaratory
order with "further relief . . . whenever necessary or proper".
U.C.A. § 78-33-8.

This chapter, U.C.A. § 78-33-1 et seq. is to be

"liberally construed and administered."

U.C.A. § 78-33-12.

Defendants correctly recognize that an extraordinary writ
(mandamus) is appropriate only where no other "plain, speedy or
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adequate remedy exists". Df bf p. 36. The administrative process
before the Commission was arguably plain and possibly speedy. But,
no adequate remedy existed for Plaintiffs before the Commission,
for the reasons discussed in the following sections.

Therefore,

the trial court properly enforced its declaratory order with an
order in the form of mandamus.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RELIEVED PLAINTIFFS OF THE
REQUIREMENT TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
From the beginning of this dispute, the only administrative
remedy

offered

Plaintiffs

was

a

formal

hearing

before

Commission with direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
310,

919.

the

R. 303-

At the time the trial court granted waiver of

administrative remedies, thousands of retirees were attempting to
protect their rights at various stages of the pre-hearing process,
but the express intent of the Commission was to rule on the issues
at a formal hearing.
Defendants insistence on a formal adjudicative proceeding
before the Commission led Plaintiffs to seek relief from exhaustion
of further remedies. The trial court, applying U.C.A. § 63-46b-14
(1987), relieved Plaintiffs of further administrative proceedings
before the Commission.
1.
The trial court had authority in U.C.A. § 63-46b-14
to relieve Plaintiffs of further administrative remedies.
Authority

for

the

court

to

relieve

Plaintiffs

of

the

requirement to exhaust administrative remedies is found in the Utah
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Administrative Procedures Act.

U.C.A. § 63-46b-14(2)(b)(i) and

(ii) reads:
The court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the
requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) administrative remedies are inadequate; or (ii) exhaustion
of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate
to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
After examining the facts, the trial court ruled that further
exhaustion would "result in irreparable harm disproportionate to
the public benefit."

R. 250-252.

The court also could have

concluded on the same facts that the administrative remedies were
inadequate.
2.
Further proceedings before the Commission would have
caused the taxpayers irreparable harm.
Initially, thousands of Plaintiffs began in the administrative
process moving toward a formal hearing before the Commission which
was publicly committed to the view that the Davis

decision did not

require refunds and the matter would be decided by the courts. R.
130.
In considering the burdens imposed by this process, the trial
court noted Defendants1 concession that the Commission had no
administrative procedures to protect members of the class. R. 251.
The Court also noted the older age of Plaintiffs, the size of the
class, the small amount of average refunds and the cost to
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Plaintiffs of further proceedings pursuant of claims before the
Commission.39
The court found particularly important "the older age of many
of the Plaintiffs."

R. 250. At one of the hearings in the trial

court, the judge said the following to counsel for the parties:
One of the things that distresses me in this case, and I will
tell you both this, is that we1 re dealing with retired
persons, we are dealing with persons who are subject to age
infirmities and maturity, . . .
R. 1157, p. 11
Also apparent was the unfairness in requiring Plaintiffs to
litigate their claims in two forums.
Washington

County v. State

As the court observed in

Tax Commission,

39

(supra),

a declaratory

Defendants challenge these findings for lack of evidence.
Df bf p. 91. But the number of retirees affected, 34,000, was
publicly announced by the Commission itself (R. 130), and
Defendants used this number in making projections. R. 723. This
figure went unchallenged by Defendants when it was set forth in the
Statement of Material Facts set forth in Plaintiffs1 Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
R. 397. Judge Young referred twice to the 34,000 figure when
questioning one of Defendants1 attorneys during a hearing. R.
1157, pp. 9 and 11. Defendants have never questioned this figure
until now, for the first time on appeal. Defendants also ignore an
unchallenged affidavit from Chairman of the Utah Coalition of
Federal Retirees fixing the class size at about 34,000. R. 241.
As to age, Defendants cite to the Federal Civil Service Act which
provides for "regular retirement at age 62 or 60, depending on
years of service." Df bf p. 28. Until now, no one has challenged
the court's finding, based on notice of law, observation, and
arguments of council that the majority of retirees are of advanced
age. As to the small size of individual claims in relation to the
cost of pursuing the claim, arguments of this before the trial
court were never contested. R. 215, 237. Defendants provided
information from which computation of the average return was made.
Projections for 1988 refunds, for example, totalled $16,253,000.
R. 725. With 34,000 potential claimants, the average refund would
only be $478.00 per claimant.
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action properly filed in district would not, of itself, terminate
the administrative procedures.
While such proceeding might be adequate to test the validity
of the statutes in question, the Commission could proceed
pursuant to [the challenged statute] while declaratory action
was pending. Thus, the petitioners might be injured even
though they prevailed in the declaratory judgment proceeding.
Washington

County

at 566.

The extraordinary remedy of a Writ of Prohibition in the
Supreme Court, recognized by this Court in Washington

County

is now

supplemented by U.C.A. § 63-46b-14, which serves the same purpose.
Ultimately, determination of the issues in a formal Commission
hearing with a record appeal would also have deprived Plaintiffs of
their due process right to a plenary hearing before a fair and
impartial tribunal and of their right to a remedy by due course of
law.
3.
Further proceedings before the Commission were not
justified by the incidental public benefit to be gained.
Defendants presented no evidence of any public benefit by
proceeding before the Commission.

The Commission was not an

impartial quasi-judicial body after it publicly announced refunds
would not be granted unless ordered by the courts.
595, 598.

R. 79, 130,

To all the world, the Commission no longer appeared

impartial.
Any remaining public benefit was an illusion only.
Commission had no authority to invalidate Utahfs tax laws, Shea
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The
v.

State

Tax Commission,

102 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274, 275 (1941), so it

was not empowered to grant the refund remedy taxpayers sought.
E. COMMISSION HEARINGS COULD NOT HAVE AFFORDED PLAINTIFFS
"DUE PROCESS" OR "REMEDY BY DUE COURSE OF LAW."
For almost three years, Defendants have urged

(tried to

compel) Plaintiffs to pursue their claims for refund before the
Commission.40 Defendants claim sole jurisdiction in the Commission
to determine the retroactivity of the Davis

decision, decide the

validity of Utah's tax laws, and to consider the availability of
refunds.

Df bf p. 35.

If the Commission does not have sole

jurisdiction, Defendants claim it to have primary concurrent
jurisdiction to proceed first.

Df bf pp. 30-37.

However, the threshold issue in this case is the validity of
Utah's tax scheme for retirees. As set forth below, consideration
of that issue in a formal hearing before the Commission with record
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court would deny Plaintiffs their rights
to due process and remedy by due course of law.

Intervention of

the district court was necessary.
1.

Tax Commission
process.

hearings

could

not

provide due

Due process is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and by the Utah Constitution Art.

40

The Commission's eagerness to claim full jurisdiction has
puzzled Plaintiffs in view of Defendants' contention that
Plaintiffs' sole remedy was to pay their taxes under protest and
pursue refunds in the district court (U.CA. § 59-1-304). Df bf
pp. 20-27.
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1, § 7. The protections are substantially similar. C/nterjneyer v.
State

Tax Commission,

102 Utah 214, 129 P.2d 881 (1942).

These

protection do not mandate a court hearing if the administrative
Id.

process provides a fair opportunity to be hecird.

As a

minimum, due process requires a fair hearing before an impartial
tribunal.
The

Nebraska

Press

Commission

was

Assoc,
not

v. Stuart,

427 U.S. 539, (1976).

impartial, having

answered

the

inquiries of hundreds of retirees, R. 1163, p. 23, with a press
release defining Utahfs response to the Davis

decision.

We view the Supreme Court ruling as applying to tax years
beginning in 1989. The Commission takes the same position as
other states with similar laws, that refunds of past taxes
paid by federal employees are not mandated by the (Davis)
decision. (emphasis added).
State Tax Commission Press Release, Issued by Chairman Roger Tew,
April 5, 1989, R. 79, 130, 595.

(Addendum Exh. 1).

The trial

court relied heavily on the Commissions want of impartiality in
denying Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss on the issue of jurisdiction
and exhaustion of remedies. R. 250.41
41

The 1989 Utah tax return information booklet, for
example, sent to all Utah taxpayers included a "Note to Federal
Retirees: . . . the issue of . . . refunds of state taxes paid in
preceding years will be decided by the Court." Specific "statutory
notices" sent to federal retirees filing amended tax returns
contains the same information. R. 919, 923. Defendants attempt to
distance themselves from the statutory notices by saying they were
from the audit division of the Commission and do not reflect a
decision by the Commission. Df bf pp. 32 and 33. But, the action
by the audit division was dictated by the Commissioners.
Deposition of Clyde Nichols, Executive Director, R. 1160, p. 5. In
arguments on the issue of administrative remedies, Defendants again
affirmed that "the Tax Commission's view is that the Davis case
applies . . . only to taxes after that date (prospective only) . R.
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Plaintiffs also faced the disconcerting problem of being
forced to plead their case before commissioners who were named
personal defendants in Plaintiffs1 pending § 1983 civil rights
action, and in opposing attorneys ostensibly arguing for the State
before the Commission but representing the Commission in court on
the same issues.42 This is not due process.
2.
Tax Commission hearings could not provide a remedy
by due course of law.
Article I# § 11 of the Utah Constitution mandates that, in
Utah:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he
is a party.
This guarantee has no analogue in the federal constitution and
is not synonymous with due process. Berry
674 (1985).

v. Beech,

111 P.2d 670,

The focus of this protection is on a fair remedy, and

mandates that individuals not be "arbitrarily deprived of effective
remedies designed to protect basic individual rights". Id.

at 675.

1158, p. 10.
42

The Attorney General's office advised the Commissioners
and assisted them in formulating a policy in dealing with Davis.
R. 1159, p. 31. The Attorney General's office is representing the
Commission in this lawsuit and following their clients' wishes in
denying refunds. If this matter was sent to the Commission for a
hearing, the same office that advises the Commission would be
arguing the Commission's position in front of the Commission. R.
1159, p. 32. Such a proceeding does not have the appearance of
fairness.
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An administrative proceeding may substitute for a court action, but
may not be used to divest a citizen of a remedy.
Celebrity

Club,

Inc.

v. Utah Liquor

1293, 1296 (Utah 1982); Industrial

Control

See generally

Comm'n Utah,

Comm'n v.

Evains,

657 P.2d

52 Utah 394,

409, 174 P.2d 825, 829 (1918).
The Commission had no authority to address the necessary
threshold issue of the legality of Utahfs tax on federal retirees.
The Commission is required by law to administer and enforce the tax
laws of the state.

U.C.A. § § 59-1-210(5), and 59-10-544(1).

It

has no discretionary power to decide what laws to enforce or to
rule laws invalid.
questions

of

The Commission is not empowered to determine

legality

or

enactments. Shea v. State

constitutionality

of

legislative

Tax Comm'n, 102 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274,

275 (1941).
In Walker Bank & Trust
592

(1964) ,

this

court

Co. v. Taylor,
held

that

15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P.2d
an

appeal

through

an

administrative agency was not a pre-requisite to bringing an action
in district court since the question before the court was one
strictly of law.
We agree that, under most circumstances, exhaustion of
administrative remedies is required before legal action may be
taken. However, this only applies where the discretion of an
administrative officer or body, acting pursuant to statutory
directive is in question. It does not apply when, as here,
the administrative officer or body, acts without the scope of
his or its defined statutory authority. The question here
involved, being strictly one of law, is for the courts and an
appeal to the Board of Examiners would have been futile and
useless.
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Id.

at 595.43
Because this case is a direct and frontal attack on the

lawfulness and constitutionality of the state income tax law44 as
applied to federal retirees, and because the Commission does not
have power to rule on a constitutional issue, any proceeding before
the Commission would have been meaningless.

"It is a basic tenet

of the law that one should not be required to do a useless thing.11
In Re:

Tanner,

549 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah 1976).

For Plaintiffs to

seek a remedy before the Commission would be futile since the
Commission could not offer the relief sought by Plaintiffs. And,
with no remedy available, Plaintiffs would have been denied access
to the courts without a "remedy by due course of law".

Utah

Constitution, Article I, § 11.
F. CONSIDERATION OF THE RETROACTIVITY OF A U.S. SUPREME COURT
DECISION IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE TAX COMMISSION'S
AUTHORITY AND EXPERTISE.

43

This language is similar to that found in Silver
v.
State
Tax Coram1 n, 168 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Sup. Ct. August 30, 1991),
wherein the Court said: "The interpretation of the language of §
59-14A-92 is a pure question of law upon which the technical
expertise of the agency and its experience in administering the tax
laws will be of no real assistance."
44

This is not the "mere introduction of a constitutional
issue" addressed in Johnson v. Retirement
Bd., 621 P.2d 1234, 12378 (Utah 1980), and Public Utilities
Comm'n v. United States,
355
U.S. 534, 539-40, 78 S.Ct. at 450, cited at Df bf p. 35.
Defendants argue that the Commission could avoid the constitutional
question by finding that the statute of limitations had expired,
but his ignores the Commission's public position that a three year
statute applied to federal retiree refund claims are long enough to
cover Plaintiff's filings. R. 930. Apparently, the Commission
desires jurisdiction to change its mind. Df bf at pp. 25-27.
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Defendants overriding defense to refunds is their claim that
Davis

is not retroactive.

R. 641-664, Df bf pp. 39-62.

They

insist that the Commission should have heard and decided this
issue. Df bf p. 35. Though the Commission does not even claim the
authority to invalidate laws45, Defendants claim it has the unique
prerogative and ability to declare a U.S. Supreme Court opinion to
have prospective-only application.46
Though the Commissioners must have knowledge of tax policy,
they need no legal training.

U.C.A. § 59-1-202.

Yet, the

Commission claims within its authority and expertise a uniquely
judicial function:

to interpret and apply the federal law of

retroactivity, a uniquely judicial doctrine.
Even if the Commission had the expertise and legal authority
to administer federal law, it would yet lack the power to relieve
a court decision of its retroactive (stare

decisis)

effect.

Such

judicial functions are not even distant cousins to the Commission's
statutory charge "to administer and supervise the tax laws of the
State."

U.C.A. § 59-1-210.

6.
THE COMMISSION COULD NOT HAVE PROTECTED THROUGH ITS
PROCEDURES ALL MEMBERS OF THE CLASS.

45

Deposition of Roger Tew, R. 612. Their sole law changing
authority is to transmit recommended changes to the governor.
U.C.A. § 59-1-210(22).
46

Apparently, they would claim the same authority to deny
retroactive effect to a Utah Supreme Court opinion which they
viewed as burdensome to the Utah Treasury.
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Well educated, informed and financially fixed federal retirees
probably

filed

timely

individual

claims

for

refund.

These

individuals may have been able to pursue their claims through
proper procedures and could have appealed, through their lawyers,
the complex legal issues of the case.47 But, options for these few
individuals would leave thousands of others with no meaningful
option at all.
Class actions allow protection for those plaintiffs who could
not protect themselves. Many federal retirees are in hospitals or
nursing homes, or are too poor or too unsophisticated to properly
file claims. Many, probably most, could not justify the expense of
hiring an attorney or CPA to properly pursue their individual
claims.

R. 303-310.

Many were undoubtedly misled by the public

pronouncements of the Commission, whom they viewed as impartial and
authoritative, telling them that Davis

did not mandate refunds.

For those reasons, and more, the representative Plaintiffs pursued
a class action.
Defendants now argue that all similarly situated retirees
could have been protected through a declaratory action before the
Commission pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-46b-21 (1989) and Utah Admin. R.
861-1-5A(Q).

Df bf p. 32.

This is not true.

Even if the

Commission had the authority to consider the complex legal issues,
47

However, the cost of such a proceeding would make such an
undertaking financially unrealistic and undoubtedly is what caused
members of the Plaintiff class to resist efforts to individually
proceed before the Commission. R. 303-310.
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and to invalidate Utah's tax law (it has no such ciuthority) , it has
never had the ability to make rulings affecting the rights of
parties

not

before

it.

A

declaratory

order

that

would

substantially prejudice the rights of a person who would be a
necessary party may be issued only if that person consents in
writing.

U.C.A. § 63-46b-21(3)(b).

To date, no person has

consented.
Obtaining the written consent of all retirees who would be
bound by the decision would have been outrageously burdensome
compared to the simpler class action procedure in court.

In view

of this, the Courtfs acknowledgement of Defendants1 concession was
justified:
Defendants concede that the Utah State Tax Commission has no
administrative procedures to consider and process a class
action that would preserve and protect the rights of and grant
relief the representative members of the class seek.
Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, paragraph 2.D. R. 251.
H.
IN DECIDING LEGAL ISSUES, THE COURT DID NOT STOP THE
COMMISSION FROM DOING WHAT IT DOES BEST.
Having decided the legal issues and concluding that refunds
should be paid to class members, the Court returned the matter to
the Commission to pay refunds.

R. 1141.

All class members who

desire refunds will now need to file amended income tax returns
which the Commission can challenge, audit and review through its
administrative process. The court has only preserved for all class
members their right to do so.
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All

considered,

this

is

a

very

fair

division

of

responsibilities between the Court and the Commission.
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENFORCED ITS ORDER RELIEVING
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES WITH A TEMPORARY
INJUNCTION.
Ignoring the court1s February 20, 1990, Order waiving further
exhaustion of administrative remedies by members of the class, the
state on May 30, 1990, attempted to compel five class members to
appear at a formal hearing on their refund claims.

R. 292.

By

this procedure, the Commission intended to bind all other retirees
to its decision.

R. 223.

The five class members sought relief from the hearing,
reaffirming their inclusion in the class and protesting the cost
and burden of a separate proceeding in light of their small refund
claims.

R. 303-310.

On June 8, 1990, the trial court enjoined for 45 days48 the
holding of administrative hearings by the Commission to allow class
members time to opt out of the class and pursue individual claims
if they desired. R. 367. The Commission was specifically directed
to proceed with hearings on those who opted out of the class. R.
367.

Defendants now object, claiming the "Tax Injunction Act bars

the District Court from enjoining Commission proceedings.11
p. 38.

Defendants' reliance on this act is misplaced.

Df bf

U.C.A. §

59-1-704 only restricts suits filed "for the purpose of restraining

The 45 days having expired, the issue is now moot.
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the assessment or collection of any tax, penalty, or interest
imposed" by the provisions cited.

The statute has no application

to an injunction enforcing a court order waiving exhaustion of
administrative remedies, for a refund of taxes already collected.
When

the

court

ruled

that Plaintiffs

need

not

exhaust

administrative remedies the Commission had no business trying to
compel further remedies.

The district courts have authority and

"power to issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary
to carry into effect their orders. . ."

U.C.A. § 78-3-4 (as

amended 1988).
X.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DEFINED THE CLASS.
Defendants1 first argument on appeal is that the trial court

erred in defining the class to:

1) include the 1984 tax year, 2)

include military retirees, and 3) include taxpayers who did not
personally protest their 1988 taxes. Df bf, pp. 19-21.
Defendants' objections regarding the inclusion of the 1984 tax
year confuse the class definition with the relief ultimately
granted.

Though initially included in the class, 1984 taxpayers

have no valid claim to a refund and were excluded from the final
class definition.

R. 01121.

Defendants1 objections to inclusion of military retirees in
the class is unfounded.

Claims presented by military retirees

present the same "questions of law or fact common to the class"
required under Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Defendants' objection is not really a class definition objection;
they raise an issue of substantive law.

Consideration of this

issue shows no legal distinction to exist between claims of
military retirees and civil service retirees49. See: § XI, supra.
Defendants1 objection to inclusion in the class of those who
did not personally file protest claims raises two issues:

1)

whether a protest is necessary, and 2) whether the actions of
several thousand class members including class representatives
suffice for all members of the class?
The first issue is an attempt to eliminate all refunds for the
years 1985 through 1987 and is Defendants1 principal dispute. See:
§ VIII,

supra.

To the extent defendants raise the second issue, Defendants
flay at the purpose of a class action.
The size of the class and even the propriety of a class action
were dictated by the declaratory relief sought in the district
court.
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made
parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected
by the declaration...

Even the Commission sees no distinction between military
and civilian retiree claims.
When asked if the Commission
distinguished the two claims, Commissioner Roger Tew answered: No.
I think our premise, from the very beginning, was that while the
Davis decision did not specifically address military, we found no
reason to except it. Depo. of Commissioner Roger Tew, R. 1163, p.
40.
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U.C.A. § 78-33-11.

The obvious mechanism for accomplishing the

legislative mandate in this case was through a class action which
Defendants do not challenge.
In addition to the mandate of § 78-33-11 is the provision of
U.C.A. § 59-10-529(7) allowing claims to be filed by the taxpayers'
"legal representative".

Among the many "legal representative(s)"

who may act for a taxpayer are court appointed representative
plaintiffs. Their actions in filing "class claims" for refund, in
protesting the tax and their later filing of a class "Protective
Claim" for refund on March 30, 1990, on a form prepared and
authorized

by

the

Commission

on

behalf

of

representatives and class members similarly

all

"class

situated"

(R.593)

protects the class.
The filing of class actions in state district court to obtain
refunds of illegal taxes were encouraged twice by the Utah Supreme
Court during the 1980's. [See: Utah Rest.
of Health,

Ass'n

v. Davis

Cty.

Bd.

709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985). "We conclude that any action

for a refund must be brought either by each food service...or by a
plaintiff suing on behalf of all the establishments as a class..."
and Olson v. Salt

Lake City

1986), citing Utah Rest.
Courts
under

contained

refund

in Utah law.

724 P.2d 960, 963 n.l (Utah

Ass'n.]

have permitted

statutory

Sch. Dist..

taxpayers

provisions

to file
which

are

In Santa Barbara Optical
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class

action

similar

to

Co.. Inc. v.

suits
those
State

Bd. of Equalization.

120 Cal. Rptr. 609, 47 Cal.App.3d 244 (1975),

the California Appeals Court states as follows:
We conclude claimant, as used in Section 910, must be equated
with the class itself and therefore reject the suggested
necessity for filing an individual claim for each member of
the purported class. To require such detailed information in
advance of the complaint would severely restrict the
maintenance of appropriate class actions - contrary to
recognized policy favoring them. We do not believe the claims
statutes were intended to thwart class relief.
Moreover, treating the class as a claimant is consistent with
the treatment of the class for purposes of filing the
complaint.
While Section 422.40 of the code of Civil
Procedure requires a complaint to name the parties, it is
settled that the pleading need only establish the existence of
an ascertainable class rather than name each member of the
class. (citations omitted).
Id.

at 611-612.
The purposes of a protest requirement, if any existed, (and if

the claim requirement contained in § 59-10-529(7) does not apply)
are to provide the commission with an opportunity to evaluate the
merits of a claim and to place it on notice as to the potential
liability.

The filing of this suit as a class action, the filing

of the class claim for refund by counsel for the Plaintiffs and the
filing of more than 55,000 amended income tax returns and/or claims
for refund by Plaintiffs satisfied these purposes.
The trial court's certification of the class also reflects the
intent of the legislative and commission to protect as many federal
retirees as possible.

The legislature affirmatively extended the

limitation for refund claims specifically for this case, and the
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Commission's actions have consistently indicated an attempt to
cover everyone.50
XI. MILITARY RETIREES WERE PROPERLY INCLUDED IN THE CLASS SINCE
MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY IS DEFERRED COMPENSATION.
Defendants argue that military retirement pay is not deferred
compensation, but represents reduced pay for reduced service.
Thus, Defendants conclude military retirement pay
compensation and not retirement compensation.

is current

Df bf p. 29.

Defendants apparently contend the Utah tax was discriminatory only
as to the nature of the compensation and not its source and is
therefore a valid tax under

Davis.51

In response to McCarty v. McCarty,

453 U.S. 210 (1981) , a case

dealing with the status of military retirement pay. Congress passed
the Uniform Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), 10

50

See, e.g., Deposition of Commissioner Roger Tew: "We were
very concerned that the right of people to challenge and to
participate in a challenge be preserved...."
I think our motivation was, we did not want to put people to
the requirement of having to fill out an amended return, which in
some cases may involve them having to go hire an accountant, etc.,
to do that, if in fact they did not prevail in final appeal.
R.1163.
51

The U.S. Supreme Court in Davis recognized that, "a tax
exemption truly intended to account for differences in retirement
benefits would not discriminate on the basis of the source of those
benefits, as Michigan's [Utah's] does; rather, it would
discriminate on the basis of the amount of benefits received by
individual retirees." Davis at 817.
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U.S.C. § 1408,52 principally to overrule McCarty and, thus, allow
states to divide military retirement pay as marital property.
Greene

v.

751 P.2d 827, 830 (Utah App. 1988) .53

Greene,

It is

clear Congress, in passing the USFSPA, viewed military retirement
pay as exactly that, retirement pay, and not reduced pay for
reduced services.
Other state supreme courts confronting the military retirement
issue in Davis

related litigation have analyzed the military

retirement pay issue and concluded that military retirement pay is
deferred compensation.
While it is true that Congress may have intended some portion
of military retirement benefits to be current compensation for
responsibilities accrued after retirement, see, e.g., McCarty,
453 U.S. at 224 n.16, the overall scheme of the retirement
benefits is akin to a civilian pension earned by the service
member for years of active service. For example, in the army
members are not allowed to draw retirement pay unless they
have served a specified period of active service, normally
twenty years. 10 U.S.C. § 3911 (1988). Retirement terminates
the right to active duty pay and allowances. 37 U.S.C. §
204(a) (1988). In addition, the amount of retirement pay is
directly proportional to the number of years spent on active
duty, (cites omitted).

^
10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1983) reads ,f[A] court may treat
disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay
periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of
the member or as property of the member and his spouse in
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court."
53

Defendants urge the court to ignore Greene because the
Court must apply federal law in determining the retroactivity of a
constitutional decision. Df bf p. 29, ftnt 4. While it is true the
retroactivity of a constitutional decision is a matter of federal
law, ATA, 110 S.Ct. at 2330, Greene is helpful in its analysis of
whether military retirement pay is deferred compensation. Greene
recognized that retired military personnel receive retirement pay.
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Kuhn v. State

Dept.

of Revenue of State

(Colo. 1991) [Also see Pledger
286,

291

(1991),

of Colo,

v. Bosnick,

wherein Arkansas

817 P.2d 101, 108

306 Ark. 45, 811 S.W.2d

reached

the

same result:

"We...believe that those cases which hold that military pay is
actually deferred compensation or in the nature of a pension
represent the better reasoned application of the law."].
Because military retirement pay is only received by one who
serves at least twenty years in the military and because, as a
general rule, retired military personnel do not provide any current
service to the armed forces, military retirement pay has all the
similarities of civilian retirement pay. This issue in the context
of Davis

litigation is now pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.54

XII.
DEFENDANTS HAD MADE ALL OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINAL
ORDER AT THE TIME IT WAS SIGNED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Defendants claim the trial court "did not allow Defendants the
prescribed time to object to Plaintiffs1 Amended Proposed Findings,
Conclusions, and Partial Summary Judgment".

Df bf p. 89.

The facts surrounding the signing of the Partial Summary
Judgment are as follows:

On March 26, 1991, Plaintiffs mailed to

the Court and to Defendants, "Proposed Findings, Conclusions and
54

In Arkansas, the state supreme court ordered refunds to
all federal retirees, including military retirees. The State of
Arkansas appealed the military refund issue to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Pledger v. Bosnick, supra, petition
for cert,
filed
(U.S.
Sept. 3, 1991) (No. 91-375). In Kansas, the state supreme court
denied the military retirees refunds under Davis.
The military
retirees appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which granted
certiorari.
Barker v. State of Kansas, 815 P.2d 46 (Kan. 1991)
Cert, granted,
60 U.S.L.W. 3395 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1991) (No. 91-611).
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Partial Summary

Judgment".55

Defendants filed

"Objections to

Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Partial Summary
Judgment" on April 3, 1991.

R. 1087.

Plaintiffs mailed to the

Court and to Defendants a "Reply to Defendants' Objections to
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Partial Summary
Judgment" on April 10, 1991.

R. 1094.

Also on April 10, 1991,

Plaintiffs mailed to the Court and to Defendants an "Amended
Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary Judgment."
bf p. 89.56

Df

The trial court acknowledged receiving the "Amended

Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary Judgment" in its
Minute Entry of April 15, 1991, R. 1110, and approved the same "to
be the final order of the Court."

Id.

Only minor changes were

made in the different versions of the Proposed Findings, Amended
Findings and Final Findings submitted to the trial court.

These

changes were set forth in a cover letter to the Court with a
courtesy copy going to Defendants' counsel.
Defendants claim they were deprived of the right to object
under Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
because the Court signed the final order prior to Defendants
objecting.

However, as an examination of Defendants' "Objections

to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Partial

This document does not currently appear in the record,
but is being added by amending the record.
56

This document is not found in the record, but is being
added pursuant to amendment.
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Summary Judgment11 bears out, Defendants did object and those
objections are on the record. R. 1087. After the Court signed the
Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary Judgment on April 16,
1991, Defendants filed another objection entitled "Defendants1
Objections to Plaintiffs1 Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions
and Partial Summary Judgment."

R. 1143.

This second objection

simply renewed the objections made in the first objection and did
not object to one additional finding that had not already been
objected to. There was no error in signing the final Order because
Defendants cannot point to any prejudice. All their rights in the
trial court and on appeal have been protected.

Defendants cannot

and do not identify any objections they would have made had more
time elapsed.
XIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' 42 U.S.C. §
1983 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION.
In Dennis
Motor Vehicles,

v.

Higgins,

Director,

v.

Nebraska

Department

of

111 S.Ct. 865 (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court held

Nebraska's collection of motor carrier taxes to be a violation of
the commerce clause to support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereafter "§
1983") civil rights action against state taxing officials.

In

doing so, the Court summarized the law of § 1983.
Last Term, in Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles,
493
U.S.
(1989), we set forth three considerations for
determining whether a federal statute
confers a "right" within
the meaning of § 1983:
"In deciding whether a federal right has been violated, we
have considered [1] whether the provision in question creates
obligations binding on the governmental unit or rather fdoes
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no more than express a congressional preference for certain
kinds of treatment.• Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981).
[2] The interest the
plaintiff asserts must not be 'too vague and amorphous1 to be
'beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.' Wright
v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority,
479 U.S. 418,
431-432 (1987) . [3] We have also asked whether the provision
in question was 'intendfed] to benefit1 the putative
plaintiff. Id. at 430; see also Id. at 433 (O1 Connor, J.
dissenting) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)." Id.
at
. See also Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association,
496 U.S.
,
(1990) (slip op. at
).
Id.

at 871.
Plaintiffs meet all three tests applied to § 111. Defendants'

defense, and the holding of the trial court, was that state
officials enjoy a "qualified immunity" and cannot be sued for
actions taken in their official capacity.
In Hafer v. Melo,
681,

decided

qualified

U.S.

, 60 USLW 4001 (Case No. 90-

Nov. 5, 1991), the Supreme Court

rejected the

immunity

given state officials acting within their

official capacity.

In sustaining a § 1983 action against the

Auditor General of Pennsylvania for violation of civil rights, the
court held:
State officers sued for damages in their official capacity are
not "persons" for purposes of the suit because they assume the
identity of the government that employs them.
JJbid. By
contrast, officers sued in their personal capacity come to
court as individuals. A government official in the role of
personal-capacity defendant thus fits comfortably within the
statutory term "person." Cf. id., at 71, n. 10 ("[A] state
official in his or her official capacity, when sued for
injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because
'official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not
treated as actions against the State'") (quoting Graham, 473
U.S. at 167, n. 14).
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Hafer seeks to overcome the distinction between official and
personal-capacity suits by arguing that § 1983 liability turns
not on the capacity in which state officials are sued, but on
the capacity in which they acted when injuring the plaintiff.
Under Will,
she asserts, state officials may not be held
liable in their personal capacity for actions they take in
their official capacity. Although one Court of Appeals has
endorsed this view, see Cowan v. University
of
Louisville
School of Medicine,
900 F.2d 936, 942-943 (CA6 1990), we find
it both unpersuasive as an interpretation of § 1983 and
foreclosed by our prior decisions.
Through § 1983, Congress sought "to give a remedy to parties
deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities
by an official's abuse of his position." Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 172 (1961). Accordingly, it authorized suits to
redress deprivations of civil rights by persons acting "under
color of any [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The requirement of action under
color of state law means that Hafer may be liable for
discharging respondents precisely because of her authority as
Auditor General. We cannot accept the novel proposition that
this same official authority insulates Hafer from suit.
Id.

USLW at p. 4003.
Defendants'

attempts

to

distinguish

these

cases

from

Plaintiffs' reliance on § 111 and the Davis decision should be read
in light of Justice Kennedy's characterization of the Dennis rule:
. . . the Court's rationale creates a § 1983 cause of action
when a State violates the constitutional doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunities, Davis v. Michigan Dept. of
Treasury,
489 U.S. 803, 813 (1989) (violation of statute
"coextensive with the prohibition against discriminatory taxes
embodied
in
the
modern
constitutional
doctrine
of
intergovernmental tax immunity. (emphasis added).
Dennis,

supra,

111 S.Ct. at 877.

In addressing an appeal of the grant of a motion to dismiss,
a reviewing court accepts as true the factual allegations contained
in the amended complaint. Lowe v. Sorenson
668

(Utah

1989).

The

facts alleged
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Research

Co.,

779 P.2d

in Plaintiffs' amended

complaint described a course of conduct by the individually named
defendants which was designed to deprive Plaintiffs of their
"rights, privileges and immunities secured by the constitution and
laws" of the United States.

§ 1983. The allegations include:

1.
Defendants had between March 28, 1989 and April 17,
1989 during which to inform Plaintiffs that they could
file a claim for refund with Defendant Utah State Tax
Commission. R. 92.
2.
Knowing Utah's taxation scheme violated Title 4
U.S.C. Ill, Defendants intentionally and publicly
misrepresented to Plaintiffs that the Davis case had no
application in Utah, that Utah's taxation scheme was not
in violation of Title 4 U.S.C. Ill, and that Plaintiffs
need not file a claim for refund for the 1985 tax year.
R. 92.
3.
Knowing Utah's taxation scheme was similar to
Michigan's and that it violated Title 4 U.S.C. Section
111, Defendants proceeded to collect taxes from
Plaintiffs for the tax year 1988, which collection was
unlawful, illegal, and amounted to an overpayment of
taxes. R. 95.
4.
Defendants had between March 28, 1989 and April 17,
1989 during which to inform Plaintiffs that no taxes
would be due or collected as a result of income received
by Plaintiffs during 1988 from federal retirement sources
or to correctly inform Plaintiffs of the proper procedure
under Utah law to receive a refund of taxes collected
under an unconstitutional and illegal law. R. 95.
5.
Between March 28, 1989 and April 17, 1989,
Defendants Hal Hansen, Joe Pacheco, Roger Tew, Blaine
Davis and Clyde Nichols deprived Plaintiffs of their
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States in violation of
Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. R. 97.
6.
By releasing inaccurate and misleading information,
Defendants conspired to deny Plaintiffs of the equal
protection and exercise of Plaintiffs' equal privileges
and immunities under the Constitution or laws of the
United States in violation of Title 42 U.S.C. Section
1983. R. 97.
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These allegations, if proven, would establish a course of
conduct engaged in by Defendants which acted to deprive them of
rights and immunities protected under the laws of the United
States.
The trial courtfs dismissal of Plaintiffs1 § 1983 action
should be reversed.
XIV. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS OF RETURN
PREPARATION SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.
Plaintiffs' award of attorneys1 fees from Defendants should be
sustained under the § 1983 civil rights claim. The cost of return
preparation is a proper award of consequential damages under §
1983.
The court coupled its declaratory order with an order in
mandamus compelling the Commission to recognize and pay refund
claims.

The court may include with the mandamus order an award of

damages and costs.
attorneys1 fees.

"Costs" in a mandamus proceeding include

Colorado

Dev. Co. v. Creer,

80 P.2d 914 (1938).

XV. FREQUENT RECURRENCE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IS ESSENTIAL TO
THE SECURITY OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE PERPETUITY OF FREE
GOVERNMENT.
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to
the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free
government."

Utah Constitution, Art. I § 27.

The provisions of

the Utah Constitution are "mandatory and prohibitory", and are not
simply words of advice.

Id.,

Art. I § 26; See:

111 P.2d at 676.
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Berry

v.

Beech,

As we celebrate this Fourth of July, we are reminded that one
of the sparks which ignited the Revolutionary War was the
abusive manner in which the colonists were being taxed by the
King. Our forefathers fought and won independence from a King
who extracted excessive taxes, and the Constitution was
drafted to protect the people from such abuses.
Beam v.

Georgia,

382 S.E. 2d 95 (Ga. 1989)

(Smith, Justice,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
Thirty-four thousand taxpayers stand before this Court with
small but honest claims.

These Utahn's paid their taxes with the

trust good people have in good government:

that the state would

not tax them wrongly, and if the state discovered a mistake, it
would give those taxes back.

The state, they trust, would not be

less honorable than its citizens who must timely pay their debts,
sometimes with tremendous difficulty. But, honorable people remain
honorable, even when it hurts.
Now, their state acknowledges its mistake, but says it would
be a financial burden to pay tax refunds. So, a seventy-eight year
old retiree in Payson finds herself with a $1,100.00 claim the
state says it cannot afford to pay.

She does not know the other

34,000 retirees. What she knows is that she has honestly paid her
taxes and debts all her life and believes that laws must not be
broken.

Nothing is more fundamental to our free government than

the basic trust between the government and each citizen, the
taxpayer who pays its bills.
The fundamental purpose of laws in a democracy is to protect
the rights of each solitary citizen against the whims and perceived
-97-

needs of all the rest.

The fundamental danger in flattening the

law when the majority feels burdened is that we are all, sometimes,
in the minority.
This case presents an unusual and timely opportunity for
recurrence to these fundamental principles.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's Partial Summary Judgment should be affirmed.
The trial courtfs earlier dismissal of Plaintiffs1 § 1983 action
should be reversed and the case should be remanded for further
proceedings.
DATED this

1H

day of January, 1992.
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES
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EXHIBIT 1

Utah State Tax Commission
Heber M. Weils Building
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City. Utah 84134

CONTACT PERSON: Lee Shew

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

TELEPHONE:

530-6104(0) £32-6432 (h)

DATE:

April 5 f 1989

SUPREME COURT RETIREMENT RULING WILL HAVE IMPACT IN UTAH
The Utah State Tax Commission has received numerous
inquiries concerning the recent U. S. Supreme Court ruling
on a Michigan law which granted a tax exemption to state
and local government retirees but taxed federal retirees.
The initial assessment by the Tax Commission is that
utan!s law is very similar to Micmgan's ana that the
ruling will have an impact in Utah.
Many questions coming to the Tax Commission have deal
with three general areas:

How should federal retirees

treat their retirement income this year for state income
taxes?

will there be refunds on state taxes paid in pasi

years?

Should feaeral retirees amend their tax returns

orctect tneir rignts unaer ~ne statute of 1 ^i-cations?
Accoraing to Tax Commissioner Roger C. Tew,

M

Our

position is that all Utah taxDayers should file their ta
as they would normally file unaer current Utah law.

We

view the Supreme Court ruling as aoplying to tax years
beginning in 1989."
"The Tax Commission takes tne same position as ctne
states with similar

laws, that refunas of past taxes pa

oy feaeral employees are not manaated by the oecision,
said Tew.
-MOREi

<

^

SUPREME COURT RULING

2-2-2-2

If a taxpayer insists on ^iling an amended return to
protect any legal rights for any year prior to 1989, the
Tax Commission requests that the taxpayer print at the top
of the tax return form, "Federal Retirement Amendment."
There are approximately 34,000 federal retirees,
including military retirees, in Utah.

The Tax Commission

is finalizing its estimation of the potential revenue
implications of exemDting these retirees from state income
tax, as state retirees are currently exemotea.

The

Commission is also analyzing the amount of potential
revenue if state and local government plus education
retirees were to be taxed on their retirement benefits.
This information should be available later this week.
Any changes in the state's treatment of retirement
benefits will have to oe consiaerea by the legislature.
•JnGer toth the Utah ana Micmgan laws, feaera'i pensions
are taxed the same as those of private incustry.

3ut there

is no taxation appliea to state and local government
retirement income cr teacher retirement income.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Michigan law "violcites
orincipies of intergovernmental tax immunity c> favoring
retired state ana local government employees zver retirea
feaeral emoloyees.
*
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EXHIBIT 2

NOTICE TO FEDERAL RETIREES
RE: DAVIS v. MICHIGAN PROTECTIVE CLAIMS

If you paid income tax on federal retirement benefits for tax years 1985, 1986, 1987,
and/or 1988, have not filed amended returns for those years and want to seek a refund,
you must protect your claim. To do so you must either file an amended return for each
year or complete this form. To protect claims tor 1985 or 1986, this form or amended
return(s) must be mailed to the Tax Commission by April 16, 1990. You may file this
form for 1987 and 1988 at a later date, but it must be done within the three-year
deadline. Completing this form does not guarantee a refund. It only protects your claim
to a refund if a refund is ordered by the courts. If refunds are ordered, you will have to
file an amended return to determine the amount of refund due to you.

PROTECTIVE CLAIM
I hereby claim a refund of any Utah income tax paid in 1985, 1986,1987, and 1988 on
federal retirement benefits.
1985
1986
1987
1988 (Circle appropriate years)

Name:
last

First

M.l.

Social Security No.:
Mailing Address:

Signature:
Mail notice to:

Date:
Utah State Tax Commission
160 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134
Attn: Federal Retiree

EXHIBIT 3

Utah State Tax Commission
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84134
(801) 530-4848 or 1-800-662-4335

Tax Bulletin 3-90
Effective Date: February 21, 1990
Re: Protective Claims for Federal Retirees
The Utah Legislature has passed a bill that extends the statute of limitations to April 16, 1990, for federal retirees filing protective claims for tax
year 1985 In response to the Davis v. Michigan ruling.
The enclosed Protective Claim form may be substituted for an
amended return and only requires federal retirees to provide their
names, Social Security numbers, addresses and signatures. One form
can provide protection for all of the years in question during the litigation. This form may be photocopied.
However, the Tax Commission emphasizes that protective claims for
tax years 1985 and 1986 must be filed by April 16. 1990. If only filing
protective claims for 1987 or 1988, the taxpayer may file later than that
date, but within the three-year statute of limitations.
The Tax Commission also will honor as protective claims incomplete
amended returns and other communications filed earlier by federal
retirees.

However, if refunds are ordered by the courts, retirees who either filed
the new form or incomplete amended returns will have to file accurate
amended returns to determine their correct refund amounts,
Questions regarding this Tax Bulletin should be directed to Taxpayer
Services, 160 East Third South, Salt Lake City, UT 84134, or by calling
(801) 530-4848 or toll free within Utah 1-800-662-4335.

EXHIBIT 4

Ch. 4

§ 111.

THE STATES

Same; taxation affecting Federal employees; income tax

The United States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation for
personal service as an officer or employee of the United States, a territory or
possession or political subdivision thereof, the government of the District of
Columbia, or an agency or instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing,
by a duly constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation
does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source
of the pay or compensation.

REVENUE AND TAXATION
59-10-529. Overpayment of tax — Credits — Refunds.
(1) In cases where there has been an overpayment
of any tax imposed by this chapter, the amount of
overpayment is credited as follows:
(a) against any income tax then due from the
taxpayer,
(b) against the amount of any judgment
against the taxpayer, including one ordering the
payment of a fine or of restitution to a victim
under Section 76-3-201, obtained through due
process of law by any entity of state government;
(c) against any child support obligation which
is delinquent, as determined by the Office of Recovery Services in the Department of Human
Services, in enforcing, under Title IV-D of the
Social Security Act, a court or administrative order for support of a child which has not been reduced to judgment, and after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, as provided in Subsection
(2);
(d) as bail, to ensure the appearance of the taxpayer before the appropriate authority to resolve
an outstanding warrant against the taxpayer for
which bail is due, if a court of competent jurisdiction has not approved an alternative form of payment. This bail may be applied to any fine or
forfeiture which is due and related to a warrant
which is outstanding on or after February 16,
1984, and in accordance with Subsections (3) and
(4).
(2) (a) Subsection (l)(c) may be exercised only if
the Office of Recovery Services serves prior written notice on the taxpayer by personal service or
certified mail, restricted delivery, stating:
(i) the amount of child support which is
alleged to be delinquent; and
(ii) that the overpayment shall be applied
to reduce that alleged child support debt unless the taxpayer appears at an administrative hearing before the department and successfully contests the child support debt or
the application of the overpayment to that
debt.
(b) If an overpayment of tax is credited against
a delinquent child support obligation in accordance with Subsection (l)(c) in non-AFDC cases,
the Office of Recovery Services shall inform the
non-AFDC custodial parent in advance if it will
first use any portion of the overpayment to satisfy unreimbursed AFDC or foster care maintenance payments which have been provided to
that family.
(c) The Department of Human Services shall
establish rules to implement this subsection, including procedures, in accordance with the other
provisions of this section, to ensure prompt reimbursement to the taxpayer of any amount of an
overpayment of taxes which was credited against
a child support obligation in error, and to ensure
prompt distribution of properly credited funds to
the custodial parent.
(3) Subsection (l)(d) may be exercised only if:

REVENUE AND TAXATION
(a) a court has issued a warrant for the arrest
of the taxpayer for failure to post bail, appear, or
otherwise satisfy the terms of a citation, summons, or court order; and
(b) a notice of intent to apply the overpayment
as bail on the issued warrant has been mailed to
the person's current address on file with the commission.
(4) (a) The commission shall deliver the overpayment applied as bail to the court that issued the
warrant of arrest. The clerk of the court is authorized to endorse the check or commission warrant
of payment on behalf of the payees and deposit
the monies in the court treasury.
(b) The court receiving the overpayment applied as bail shall order withdrawal of the warrant for arrest of the taxpayer if the case is one
for which a personal appearance of the taxpayer
is not required and if die dollar amount of the
overpayment represents the full dollar amount of
bail. In all other cases, the court receiving the
overpayment applied as bail is not required to
order the withdrawal of the warrant of arrest of
the taxpayer during the 40-day period, and the
taxpayer may be arrested on the warrant. However, the bail amount shall be reduced by the
amount of tax overpayment received by the
court.
(c) If the taxpayer fails to respond to the notice
described in Subsection (3), or to resolve the warrant within 40 days after the mailing under that
subsection, the overpayment applied as bail is
forfeited and notice of the forfeiture shall be
mailed to the taxpayer at the current address on
file with the commission. The court may then
issue another warrant or allow the original warrant to remain in force if:
(i) the taxpayer has not complied with an
order of the court;
(ii) the taxpayer has failed to appear and
respond to a criminal charge for which a personal appearance is required; or
(iii) the taxpayer has paid partial but not
full bail in a case for which a personal appearance is not required.
(5) If the alleged violations named in the warrant
are later resolved in favor of the taxpayer, the bail
amount shall be remitted to the taxpayer.
(6) Any balance shall be refunded immediately to
the taxpayer.
(7) (a) If a refund or credit is due because the
amount of tax deducted and withheld from wages
exceeds the actual tax due, no refund or credit
may be made or allowed unless the taxpayer or
his legal representative files with the commission a tax return claiming the refund or credit:
(i) within three years from the due date of
the return, plus the period of any extension
of time for filing the return; or
(ii) within two years from the date the tax
was paid, whichever period is later,
(b) In other instances where a refund or credit
of tax which has not been deducted and withheld
from income is due, no credit or refund may be
allowed or made after three years from the time
the tax was paid, unless, before the expiration of
the period, a claim is filed by the taxpayer or his
legal representative.
(8) The fine and bail forfeiture provisions of this
section apply to all warrants and fines issued in cases
charging the taxpayer with a felony, a misdemeanor,

or an infraction described in this section which are
outstanding on or after February 16, 1984.
(9) If the amount allowable as a credit for tax withheld from the taxpayer exceeds the tax to which the
credit relates, the excess is considered an overpayment.
(10) A claim for credit or refund of an overpayment
which is attributable to the application to the taxpayer of a net operating loss carryback shall be fried
within three years from the time the return was due
for the taxable year of the loss.
(11) If there has been an overpayment of the tax
which is required to be deducted and withheld under
Section 59-10-402, a refund shall be made to the employer only to the extent that the amount of overpayment was not deducted and withheld by the employer.
(12) If there is no tax liability for a period in which
an amount is paid as income tax, the amount is an
overpayment.
(13) If an income tax is assessed or collected after
the expiration of the applicable period of limitation,
that amount is an overpayment.
(14) (a) If a taxpayer is required to report a
change or correction in federal taxable income
reported on his federal income tax return, or to
report a change or correction which is treated in
the same manner as if it were an overpayment
for federal income tax purposes, or to file an
amended return with the commission, a claim for
credit or refund of any resulting overpayment of
tax shall be filed by the taxpayer within two
years from the date the notice of the change, correction, or amended return was required to be
filed with the commission.
(b) If the report or amended return is not filed
within 90 days, interest on any resulting refund
or credit ceases to accrue after the 90-day period.
(c) The amount of the credit or refund may not
exceed the amount of the reduction in tax attributable to the federal change, correction, or items
amended on the taxpayer's amended federal income tax return.
(d) Except as specifically provided, this section
does not affect the amount or the time within
which a claim for credit or refund may be filed.
(15) No credit or refund may be allowed or made if
the overpayment is less than $1.
(16) The amount of the credit or refund may not
exceed the tax paid during the three years immediately preceding the filing of the claim, or if no claim
is filed, then during the three years immediately preceding the allowance of the credit or refund.
(17) In the case of an overpayment of tax by the
employer under the withholding provisions of this
chapter, a refund or credit shall be made to the employer only to the extent that the amount of the overpayment was not deducted and withheld from wages
under the provisions of this chapter.
(18) If a taxpayer who is entitled to a refund under
this chapter dies, the commission may make payment
to the duly appointed executor or administrator of the
taxpayer's estate. If there is no executor or administrator, payment may be made to those persons who
establish entitlement to inherit the property of the
decedent in the proportions set out in Title 75.
(19) Where an overpayment relates to adjustments
to net income referred to in Subsection 59-10-536
(3)(c), credit may be allowed or a refund paid any
time before the expiration of the period within which
a deficiency may be assessed.
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63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of
final agency action, except in actions where judicial
review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or
all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after
the date that the order constituting the final
agency action is issued or is considered to have
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all
other appropriate parties as respondents and
shall meet the form requirements specified in
this chapter.
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78-33-1.

Jurisdiction of district courts ~

Form —

Effect.

The district courts within their respective jurisdictions
shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal
relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.
No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground
that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for.
The
declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and
effect; and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree.
78-33-2.

Rights, status, legal relations under instruments or
statutes may be determined.

Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract,
or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a
statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have
determined any question of construction or validity arising under
the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and
obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations
thereunder.

UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I, § 2
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform
their government as the public welfare may require.
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I, § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty of property,
without due process of law.
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I, § 11
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. I, § 24
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
privilege or immunity.
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. VIII, § 5
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, and
power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court shall
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute.
The
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate,
shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally
with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of
right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.

